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That nostalgiafor unity, that appetitefor the absolute illustrates
the essential impulse of the human drama. But the fact of that
nostalgia'sexistence does not imply that it is to be immediately
satisfied. For if, bridging the gulf that separates desire from
conquest, we assert with Parmenides the reality of the One
(whatever it may be), we fall into the ridiculouscontradictionof
a mind that asserts total unity and proves by its very assertion its
own difference and the diversity it claimed to resolve. This other
vicious circle is enough to stifle our hopes. ... So long as the
mind keeps silent in the motionless world of its hopes, everything
is reflected and arranged in the unity of its nostalgia. But with
its first move this world cracks and tumbles: an infinite number
of shimmeringfragments is offered to the understanding.

I can negate everything of that part of me that lives on vague
nostalgias,except this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this
need for clarity and cohesion. I can refute everything in this
world surroundingme that offends or enraptures me, except this
chaos, this sovereign chance and this divine equivalence which
springsfrom anarchy.
Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus

INTRODUCTION

Judges must take cognizance of the dangers of legalfragmentation, and of inconsistency in the case-law, as a result of the
quasi-anarchicproliferationof internationalcourts.'
Admittedly, beginning an article on the fragmentation of international law with these words of former President of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), Judge Gilbert Guillaume, is a good way to encourage any cursory reader to put the work aside. Although
I.
Gilbert Guillaume, President, International Court of Justice, The Proliferation of
International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the International Legal Order, Address Before
the G.A. of the U.N. (Oct. 27, 2000), http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?pr=-85&pt=
3&pl=l&p2=3&p3=l (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Guillaume Address].
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platitudinous, such an introduction highlights the debate that has developed around the issue of fragmentation within an institutional
environment of cross dynamics. The first example President Guillaume
offered in proof of his conclusion was the European Court of Human
Rights' (ECtHR) 1995 decision on the preliminary objections of the Loizidou case,2 criticizing the Strasbourg Court for adopting a different
position than the ICJ on the effect of territorial reservations with respect
to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).3 In fact, not only
did the ECtHR remain silent regarding the relevant ICJ case law, it also
described, remarkably explicitly, the so-called special character of the
ECHR, stating that Strasbourg judges "must bear in mind the special
order
character of the Convention as an instrument of European public
4
beings."
human
individual
of
protection
the
for
(ordrepublic)
Notably, the ECtHR had provided a response to President Guillaume's criticisms as early as 1996. Almost four years before being
accused of threatening the normative unity of general international law,
the ECtHR stated in its judgment on the merits in Loizidou:
[T]he [European] Convention must be interpreted in the light of
the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention of 23
May 1969 on the Law of Treaties and [ ] Article 31 § 3 (c) of
that treaty indicates that account is to be taken of "any relevant
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties" .... In the Court's view, the principles underlying the
Convention cannot be interpreted and applied in a vacuum.
Mindful of the Convention's special character as a human rights
treaty, it must also take into account any relevant rules of international law .... 5
Then and now the ECtHR seems to be making a clear point: it has
consistently denied breaching any of its traditional ties with general international law, and has always maintained that the mission of its judges
is to interpret the ECHR in the light of the international legal order.
However, as will be shown below, creating an equilibrium between the
special character of the ECHR and its subordination to the logic and
economy of the international legal system is a difficult task. This Article
2.

Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1995) (decision on the prelimi-

nary objections).
Guillaume Address, supra note 1 (citing Convention for the Protection of Human
3.
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]).
Loizidou, 3 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (decision on the preliminary objections).
4.
Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2231, 43 (judgment on the mer5.
its) (citing 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]).
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seeks to evaluate the ECtHR's tacit and explicit applications of Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 6 The
International Law Commission (ILC) quite recently brought Article
31(3)(c) to the fore by suggesting that it introduces an autonomous method of interpretation-namely systemic integration.' However, as will
be argued below, the history of Article 31(3)(c), both in terms of the
original vision of its drafters and the role it plays in the practice of the
ECtHR, suggests it may be useful for other interpretative purposes. Taking these preliminary remarks into account, this Article considers three
main questions: (1) How effective can Article 31(3)(c) be as a remedy
against the fragmentation of international law? (2) To what extent may
Article 31(3)(c) accommodate techniques of interpretation other than
that of systemic integration? And (3), how should the relationship between these distinct interpretative methods be conceptualized?
There are three reasons for choosing the normative environment of
the ECHR to test the effectiveness of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. First,
it is useful to do so in order to investigate the following oxymoron:
among specialized international judicial institutions, the ECtHR is often
accused of fragmenting international law yet invokes Article 31(3)(c) the
most frequently! Indeed, in comparison with other international courts
and tribunals, the ECtHR's case law offers a remarkable illustration of
explicit references to the article, some of which go back several years
before it emerged as an anti-fragmentation tool.
Secondly, the effectiveness of the ECHR system for the protection of
human rights and the way this effectiveness is reinforced by the legitimacy of its humanistic telos turns it into a potential communicant of
droitdelhommisme, or "human rightism"-the famous neologism intro6.
VCLT, supra note 5, art. 31(3)(c) ("There shall be taken into account, together with
the context: ... any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.").
7.
According to this method of interpretation, each instrunentum of international law
must be interpreted and applied in a manner that safeguards harmony within the broader normative environment-that is, the international legal order. As explained in Part I.B, infra, this

particular method of interpretation has recently been promoted by the International Law
Commission (ILC) and legal scholarship as one of the main tools for counteracting the normative fragmentation of international law. It is widely regarded as one of the main channels that
enable the concurrence between special and general international law.
8.
See Jean-Marc Sorel, Article 31: Convention de 1969, in LES CONVENTIONS DE
VIENNE SUR LE DROIT DES TRAIT S: COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE 1289, 1322

(Maxime Didat ed., 2006). See also the reprobative comments made by former President of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Robert Y. Jennings, The Proliferationof Adjudica-

tory Bodies: Dangers and Possible Answers, in

IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION OF

INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY BODIES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

2, 5-6 (Am. Soc'y Int'l L.

Bull. No. 9, 1995), who argues that the Loizidou decision on preliminary objections is evidence of the danger of fragmentation of international law due to the proliferation of
international courts and tribunals.
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duced and used by Pellet to criticize that part of international legal
scholarship which, in his view, actively and militantly promotes the idea
of human rights as "idiosyncratic" within international law.9 However,
scholarly criticism of the ECtHR extends well beyond the classification
of its system as a self-contained regime.' The ECtHR not only knowingly disregards general international law, but it also intentionally
introduces into international law elements that are foreign to its traditional, state-centric structures and that international law cannot
accommodate. The moral weight of the system of the ECHR, the
ECtHR's voluminous case law, and especially its effectiveness in the
implementation stage (with certain well-known exceptions), transform
the ECtHR from a modest regional international judicial institution with
a specialized competence into an influential systemic player. It is in this
capacity that critics such as President Guillaume reproach the fact that
the ECtHR refuses to accept the role of a compliant recipient of the dictates of general international law, and instead asserts its right to actively
participate in the process of this general international law's interpretative
evolution." Thus, in addition to expressing concern for the ECtHR's role
in fragmenting international law, its critics fear that the court stimulates
the so-called "humanization" of international law.'2 Although measuring
9.

See Alain Pellet, "Human Rightism" and International Law, 2000 ITALIAN Y.B.
L. 3. Despite his diplomacy, Pellet clearly accuses the "human rightist" scholarship of
promoting the "idiosyncrasy" of human rights, as well as "tak[ing] their desires for realities
...as legal truths." Id. at 5.
10.
On the origins of the term, see Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 1985 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. I 11. The term's actual content has been defined amply. In legal scholarship, the
term "self-contained regime" has been used to imply both an international legal subsystem
entirely separate and autonomous from general international law, and a legal subsystem which
simply contains a set of leges specialesdesigned to exclude only the application of the general
legal consequences of international wrongfulness, that is to say the secondary norms of international law on state responsibility. For more details on these definitions, see Bruno Simma &
Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in InternationalLaw,
17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 483, 490-93 (2006).
11.
See Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public InternationalLaw: Between Technique
and Politics, 70 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2007). Koskenniemi explains very eloquently that
"[s]pecializations such as 'trade law', 'human rights law', 'environmental law', 'criminal law',
,security law', 'European Law' and so on started to reverse established legal hierarchies in
favour of the structural bias in the relevant functional expertise ....It is this change to which
international lawyers have reacted by speculating on the 'dangers' of incoherence, forum
shopping and, perhaps characteristically, 'loss of overall control.'" Id. at 4.
12.
However, in order to avoid giving the wrong impression, it is important to note that
most legal scholarship welcomes the impact of human rights on public international law. The
title of Theodor Meron's 2003 course on public international law at the Hague Academy of
INT'L

International Law speaks for itself. See

THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNA-

(2006). Judge Bruno Simma devoted his own general course at the Hague
Academy in 2009 to The Impact of Human Rights on InternationalLaw. See Bruno Simma:
Principal Publications, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/?pl=l &p2=2&p3=I&judge=14 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). For a summarized analysis of the humanizing effects of international
TIONAL LAW
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the influence of the ECHR's regime over the broader general system is
beyond the scope of this Article, what can be legitimately presumed here
is that whenever the court relies upon its so-called pro-homine specialty
to diverge from the economy of the broader international legal order and
turn a deaf ear to the tempo given by its premier institutions (as it did in
Loizidou)," then not only does it fragment the unity of this broader legal
order but it also challenges the fundamentally state-centric (which is not
to say voluntarist) premises on which it is based. An effective Article
31(3)(c) (at least in the sense that the ILC promotes) requires that the
Strasbourg Court-a regional court entrusted with the interpretation of a
"special" convention-identify the center of gravity of its system as outside its microcosmos, in order not to threaten the whole systemic (if
arguably indiscernible) symphony.
The third and final reason to assess the effectiveness of Article
31(3)(c) within the paradigm of the ECHR relates to its idiosyncratic
nature, which is marked by inherent centrifugal tensions that render it
susceptible to fragmentation. Formally, the ECHR is a typical multilateral international treaty. As such, it is the product of general international
law-both its own binding force and its normative qualities stem from
the same general international law. However, at the same time, the Convention presents the qualitative-both normative and socio-politicalcharacteristics of what will be described infra as a multi-level specialty.
Although an international treaty, the ECHR also serves as a regional
quasi-constitution 4 that delimits an increasingly integrated public order,
human rights on general international law, see Menno T. Kamminga, Humanisation of International Law, in CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF CEES FLINTERMAN 29 (Ineke Boerefijn & Jenny Goldschmidt eds., 2008). For a
collection of essays on the topic, see THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (Menno T. Kamminga & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009).

13.
See, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Preface to L'INFLUENCE DES SOURCES SUR L'UNIT9
ET LA FRAGMENTATION DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL, at viii (Rosario Huesa Vinaixa & Karel
Wellens eds., 2006) [hereinafter L'INFLUENCE DES SOURCES] (discussing that, while manifestly
careful not to outpace the opinio juris of states, the ICJ's case law seems to be setting the
tempo of the evolution of general international law).
14.
The debate about the constitutional functions of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) is long standing and still open. See, for example, the article by the former
President of the ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber, A ConstitutionalFuturefor the European Court of
Human Rights?, 23 HUM. RTS. L.J. 161, 165 (2002) (arguing that the ECtHR should limit its
decisions to "'constitutional' decisions of principle"). One of the first works to examine the
question was Jean-Frangois Flauss, La Cour europdenne des droits de lhomme est-elle une
cour constitutionnelle?,in LA CONVENTION EUROPIIENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME: DEVELOPPEMENTS RfCENTS ET NOUVEAUX DtFIS 69 (Droit et justice collection dirigde par Pierre
Lambert No. 19, Jean-Franqois Flauss & Michel de Salvia, eds. 1997). See also Robert Harmsen, The European Court of Human Rights as a 'Constitutional Court': Definitional Debates
and the Dynamics of Reform, in JUDGES, TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33, 41 (John Morison et al. eds., 2007) (highlighting the "systemic turn" in the case law of Strasbourg, in
which the ECtHR has focused on specific human rights protection problems); Wojciech
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and seeks to protect certain values within a very specific geographic,
cultural, social, political, and economic milieu, namely the European
continent. Hence, the ECHRs' so-called specialty is not limited to its
human rights teleology and the erga omnes partes normative quality of
its substantive provisions-which, moreover, are characteristics common
to all human rights conventions. Beyond this obvious dimension of normative specialty, the ECHR is equally special at the socio-political level
in that it is called upon to produce results within the particular social
context that designed its regime and gave it the tools to gradually help
construct common minimum standards in the fields of human rights,
democracy, and the rule of law within the single European public order.
In short, ECHR regime delimits a particular socio-normative environment in which it is extremely difficult for the systemic integration
technique to produce anti-fragmentation results.
Before demonstrating how the case law of the ECtHR gives effect to
Article 31(3)(c), it is useful to provide certain theoretical illustrations
that can serve as a basis for the analysis that will follow. In Part I the Article will briefly introduce the question of the fragmentation of
international law, and will more extensively delineate the role that the
ILC attributed to Article 31(3)(c) and the ILC's expectations regarding
its success in this role. Next, Part II will give an overview of the special
elements of the ECHR socio-normative environment, which gave rise to
the case law into which Article 31(3)(c) came into force. The Article will
argue that, in addition to benefiting from the very special nature of the
ECHR, the Strasbourg Court also has a significant number of interpretative tools that allow it to enjoy wide discretion in the choices it often has
to make regarding the dilemma between unconditional integration into
the international legal order and its (regional) human rights specialty.
Once concluded the theoretical part of the study, the Article will proceed
in Part III to test the use of Article 31(3)(c) in the case law of the
ECtHR. The object of this Part of the study is to assess the validity of the
presumptions that Parts I and H introduced with regard to the function of
Sadurski, Partneringwith Strasbourg: Constitutionalizationof the European Court of Human
Rights, the Accession of Central and Eastern European States to the Council of Europe, and
the Idea of Pilot Judgments (Eur. Univ. Inst. Working Paper No. EUI LAW 2008/33, 2008),
available at http://hdl.handle.net/1814/9887 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (noting that the
enlargement of the Council of Europe is an opportunity for the ECtHR to adopt a quasiconstitutional role by ruling on the systemic defects of domestic legal orders); cf Louis
Favoreu, Cours constitutionnellesnationaleset Cour europienne des droits de l'Homme, in 1
LIBERT9S,

JUSTICE, TOLERANCE:

MtLANGES

EN

HOMAGE

AU

DOYEN

GfRARD COHEN-

JONATHAN 789, 797 (Luigi Condorelli, Jean-Frangois Flauss, Charles Leben, & Philippe
Weckel, eds., 2004) (explaining why the ECtHR does not correspond to the European model
of constitutional justice in which constitutional courts are situated outside of the ordinary legal
process).
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Article 31(3)(c) within a special regime of international law. Part Ill is
structured at two main levels, and will first address the question of normative fragmentation, and second its judicial institutional counterpart.
Finally, Part III will consider the evolutive effects of Article 31(3)(c) as
these are integrated in the broader question of fragmentation generally,
and will treat these effects separately in certain instances, as further delineated in that Part.
I. THE RISK OF NORMATIVE FRAGMENTATION:
NEW PROBLEMS, OLD CONTRIVANCES

A. The FragmentationDichotomy: Towards a Telos?
Although the proliferation of international judicial fora has had a
beneficial effect on both the development and the effective application
and enforcement of international rules, it is also due to this same phenomenon that international law is seen as undergoing fragmentation.
"Post-modem anxieties" 5 about the risks of chipping away at the normative unity of international law and of gradually deforming its legal order
have added to the more classical selection of worries, and a new theoretical dichotomy has thus entered the discipline. If for a classic or even
a modem international lawyer the dilemma was between objectivism and
voluntarism, the post-modem generation has to choose between the unity
or fragmentation of an international legal order that is becoming increasingly pluralistic while not yet confident enough about its systemic
morphology.
All the same, it would not come as a complete surprise to suggest
that the whole fragmentation discourse is nothing more than a pseudodilemma. 6 In fact, such a view would have the support of the extreme
trends of international law. A complete negation of the existence of any
international legal order and the defense of its virtually absolute unity
and harmony would appear to be two sides of the same coin, neither of
which perceive a threat of fragmentation. 7 What, however, should be
15.
See Martti Koskenniemi & Padivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553 (2002).
16.
See, e.g., Mario Prost, All Shouting the Same Slogans: InternationalLaw's Unities
and the Politics of Fragmentation,2006 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 131, 152 ("There is no objective or neutral approach to issues of fragmentation. Any discourse on fragmentation reflects
certain preferences regarding the nature and function of international law as either rules, lan-

guage or values.").
17.
See Bruno Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845,
847 (2004) ("To diagnose a process of fragmentation at all logically presupposes that the observer proceeds from an image of international law constituting a whole, something closed
and firm, which now threatens to fall into pieces?').
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highlighted is that, for the majority of scholars, pluralism means heterogeneity, which-to a large extent-jeopardizes the integrity of the
international legal order."
The core, then, of normative fragmentation '9 could be described as a
story about normative planets or comets-both in their original general
content as well as in the more specific content that they have expressed
since judicial interpretation. These planets either follow a course deviating from the international law galaxy or else are to be found on a path to
collision with their Helios-general international law-which tends to
maintain a systemic equilibrium. 0 The former refers to the "special" or
"self-contained regimes," which, regarded from a perspective of autosuffisance, proclaim a sui generis right to self-determination, reject the
idea that they are part of the international legal order, and deny coming
under its structures and general rules. The latter group corresponds to the
phenomenon of conflicting or incompatible norms within a highly decentralized international legal universe, without excluding the wellknown scenario according to which the same international norm has
been given different effect by more than one court. 21
18.
It should be noted, however, that most scholars emphasize the institutional dimension of that pluralism (i.e., the so-called proliferation of international judicial bodies). See
Martti Koskenniemi, What Is InternationalLaw for?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 89, 110 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 2003) (arguing that behind the fragmentation problem there is a
"hegemonic struggle where each institution, though partial, tries to occupy the space of the
whole"); Tullio Treves, Fragmentationof International Law: The Judicial Perspective, 23
COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI

821, 831-32 (2007) (suggesting that "[u]nderneath the discussion

[on fragmentation] lies a clash for power between institutions and the persons which partake
in the decisions of these institutions ....
It is a debate on whether the last word on international law questions must belong to the International Court of Justice, on whether specialized
or generalist international lawyers are best suited to deal with questions belonging to specialized fields."); see also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 45 (2001) (claiming, more
optimistically, that fragmentation is gradually receding thanks to "interpenetration and crossfertilization of previously somewhat compartmentalized areas of international law").
19.
The ILC's approach excludes the institutional dimension of fragmentation and only
examines the question from a purely normative point of view. See Int'l L. Comm'n [ILC],
Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of InternationalLaw: Difficulties Arising from
the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, In 5-25. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.644
(July 18, 2003); see also Simma, supra note 17, at 846 (suggesting that the institutional dimension of fragmentation should exclude the judicial aspect, since "if there are international
institutions that are constantly and painstakingly aware of the necessity to preserve the coherence of international law, it is the international courts and tribunals").
20.
See Matthew Craven, Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentationof InternationalLaw,
2003 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 32 (" 'Fragmentation' is simply a way of expressing, with certain obvious overtones, a concern that the disciplinary centre can no longer hold the forces of
diversity in check.").
21.
Given the institutional dimension of fragmentation and the role of inconsistency in
the case law of various international judicial entities, Pierre-Marie Dupuy pleads for "a central
role for the ICJ." See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Dangerof Fragmentationor Unification of the
International Legal System and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 791, 798 (1999). Contra Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and Running a
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The ILC pointed out early on that the fragmentation phenomenon,
"as an expression of diversification and expansion of international law,"
might give rise to both negative and positive results.22 For the optimists,23
fragmentation can be understood as an expression of maturity; it is
nothing more than a rather painful step towards the telos
(end/scope/objective) of the systemic integration of the international legal order. On the other hand, the pessimists conceive of this same trend
towards fragmentation as evidence of disintegration, incoherence, and
disunity, bringing general international law closer to a status of inefficiency and shrinkage, if not to its telos (end/termination).
B. Article 31(3)(c) and Its Late Elevation to an 24
Anti-FragmentationTool: A Servitore di due Padroni?
What is important in the context of this Article is not so much
whether fragmentation is a threat to the integrity or further integration of
the international legal order, or whether it simply corresponds to a necessary and unavoidable step in the evolution of this order, or both.
Undoubtedly, any reference to the notion of a legal order structured as a
system requires at very least a classification of its normative constituents, as well as a set of mechanisms administering the relationship
between these differently classified elements. The notion of hierarchy,
which provides solutions to conflicts between norms of different legal
standing, needs to be complemented by techniques for the setting of priorities in the case of conflicts between "parallel" rules. 25 This is, for
instance, the role of the two classic principles of lex posterior derogat
priori (that is, that a more recent law overrules an inconsistent earlier
law) and lex specialis derogat generalis(that is, that a specific law overrules a general law).
In addition to these conflict resolution mechanisms, the ILC followed another route. Taking into account that one of the features
Tight Courtroom, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 121 (2001) (arguing in favor of judicial decentralization).
22.
ILC, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 6, U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/L.663/Rev. 1 (July 28, 2004).
23.
Georges Abi-Saab was one of the first to point out that fragmentation also contains
some "healthy" elements. See Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL. 818, 925 (1999); see also Kalypso Nicola'dis
& Joyce L. Tong, Diversity or Cacophony? The Continuing Debate over New Sources of InternationalLaw, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1349, 1361-65 (2004).

24.

CARLO GOLDONI, THE SERVANT OF TWo MASTERS

(Jeffrey Hatcher & Paolo Emilio

Landi trans., Dramatists Play Service Inc. 2004) (1743).
See generally the very interesting course at the Hague Academy of International
25.
Law by Emmanuel Roucounas, Engagements parallkles et contradictoires,in 6 RECUEIL DES
COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAVE

(1987).
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inherent to fragmentation is that of normative pluralism, especially in the
relationship established between general and special norms or regimes,
the ILC brought to the fore Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. Although initially international legal practitioners were reluctant to implement the
article, as fragmentation became more widespread both legal scholarship 6 and the ILC (re)discovered the usefulness of the method(s) laid
down in the article-this time as an anti-fragmentation tool.
This provision (the customary nature of which is uncontested),27
when read in the broader framework of Article 31 of the VCLT, enables
the judge of any court or tribunal to integrate general international law
into her judicial reasoning, along with any "relevant" and "applicable"
special legal obligations which are binding on the parties. In other
words, Article 31(3)(c) functions as "a 'master key' to the house of international law"2 and renders possible the inclusion of sources external
but relevant to the norm under interpretation, thus allowing the judge to
take into account the broader normative environment. It goes without
saying that this should always be done following the so-called "principle
of harmonization," according to which, when a plurality of norms affects
the same subject the interpretation should always attempt to achieve
conciliation.29
However, the ILC did not limit itself to simply calling attention to
Article 31(3)(c). It went further 0 and recruited the article into the
26.
See Philippe Sands, Vers une transformationdu droit international?Institutionnaliser le doute, in 4 DROIT INTERNATIONAL 213, 220-30 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Ch. Leben,
eds., 2000). As Sands argued, Article 31(3)(c) has a general applicability that may cover the
relationship between different branches of international law and different norms. Id. at 213.
According to Sands, Article 31(3)(c) sets up the principle of integration, which seeks unity in
international law and requires that norms not be envisaged as isolated from general international law. Id. at 222.
27.
See, e.g., Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53,
69-70 (Nov. 12). Recently, the ICJ reconfirmed the customary nature of Article 31 (3)(c). See
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. 37 (June
4), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/I 36/14550.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
28.
This term was introduced by Xue Hanqin during the ILC debates on the significance of Article 31(3)(c). ILC, Final Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of
International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 420, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (prepared by Martti
Koskenniemi) [hereinafter ILC, FinalReport on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw].
29.
On the nature of harmonization, see Nele Matz-Liick, Harmonization, Systemic
Integration, and 'Mutual Supportiveness' as Conflict-Solution Techniques: Different Modes of
Interpretationas a Challenge to Negative Effects of Fragmentation, 2006 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L
L. 37, 45-47. Starting from the presumption that normative conflicts are not intentional, MatzLiick concludes that harmonization is neither a technique nor a tool as such. It simply introduces "a concept in need of the employment of subsidiary methods which serve the higher
objective of coherence of norms." Id. at 45.
30.
Nevertheless, it did not do so until 2005, in accordance with the revised paper submitted by one of its members, Professor Mansfield. See ILC, Report of the Study Group on
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services of the systemic integration method of interpretation. In this role
Article 31(3)(c) deus ex machina introduces a legal principle:3' since international treaties are the product of international law and part of its
respective legal order,32 they should always be interpreted in a way that,
by taking into consideration the broader normative environment, will
avoid fragmenting it.33 Gradually, legal scholarship came to second the
idea of systemic integration. Hence, not only did legal scholarship recognize systemic integration as a well-established principle of
international law, but it also generously offered the principle the status of
a constitutional norm!3
The rationale underlying this approach is self-evident. The term
"fragmentation" bears a clear negative connotation: it is considered to be
a problem, a malfunction of the system, a symptom of disorder, a threat.
Therefore, maintaining the unity of the international legal order-a conditio sine qua non for this order to operate effectively-becomes an
Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties Arisingfrom the Diversificationand Expansion of InternationalLaw, 127, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.676 (July 29, 2005).
31.
See ILC, Final Report on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, supra note 28, 415
("[T]he principle of systemic integration goes further than merely restat[ing] the applicability
of general international law in the operation of particular treaties. It points to a need to take
into account the normative environment more widely.").
32.
ILC, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: Difficulties
Arisingfrom the Diversificationand Expansion of InternationalLaw: Conclusions of the Work
of the Study Group, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006). The ILC points out that Article
31(3)(c) "gives expression to the objective of 'systemic integration' according to which, whatever their subject matter, treaties are a creation of the international legal system and their
operation is predicated upon that fact." Id. 1 14(17).
33.
See ILC, FinalReport on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, supra note 28, 1 410
(explaining that special instruments are to be applied "with minimal disturbance to the operation of the legal system").
34.
See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 279, 280 (2005). According to
McLachlan's view, systemic integration reflects "a more general principle of treaty interpretation ...[that] operates ... as an inarticulated major premise in the construction of treaties ...
[and] flows so inevitably from the nature of a treaty as an agreement 'governed by international law'" that it has attained within the international legal system the "status of a
constitutional norm.' Id. at 280 (quoting VCLT, supra note 6, art. 2(l)(a); cf Karel Wellens,
Quelques r~fiexions d'introduction,in L'INFLUENCE DES SOURCES, supra note 13, at 1, 20-21
(providing a more cautious approach that raises questions regarding whether systemic integration has indeed emerged as a principle of international law and whether this would suggest
that systemic integration-in keeping with the aim of maintaining the unity of international
law-should prevail over other means of interpretation). Contra Benedetto Conforti, Uniti et
fragmentation du droit international: "Glissez, mortels, n'appuyez pas!", 111 REVUE G9NIRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5, 16 (2007) (arguing that the ILC's conception of
the special role of systemic integration does not find a confirmation in international reality and
defending courts' discretion to freely choose among the means of interpretation they consider
most appropriate); see also ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS
AND RULES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 367 (2008) (highlighting the insufficiencies of
the systemic integration method of interpretation, since "integration relates to a result, while
interpretation methods definitionally relate to methods and means").
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objective per se, a common necessity for the whole international community. According to the logic underlying systemic integration, the aim
and purpose pursued by a given norm of international law can only be
realized as long as and to the extent that its effect will not fragment international law. Granting Article 31(3)(c) de facto primacy above other
methods of interpretation thus seeks to guarantee that fragmentation will
be avoided. 5 Moreover, attribution of a particular priority to the objectives pursued by systemic integration implies that the teleology pursued
by another norm of international law can achieve its effet utile only to
the extent that it does not impede the unity of international law. The upgrading of Article 31(3)(c) from one simple interpretative method among
others to a principle of international law or a constitutional norm can
thus only be explained as a reaction-the (self-)defense of a system
threatened to explode into compartmentalized pieces.
However, in spite of its openly pro-international legal order orientation, this approach reveals profound self-awareness. Rather than using
the contiguous term of systematic interpretation, 6 which is a well-known
technique within municipal law, the ILC christens this tool of interpretation with the name of "systemic integration," which has two
implications. In addition to implying that special international law is, by
means of interpretation, harmonically integrated within the general system, it also suggests that, thanks to a process of harmonious integration,
the system of international law is becoming more complete, firm, compact, and uniform-or, in a word, integrated. The decentralized nature of
the international legal order, its imperfect institutionalization, the absence of objectivity, and the dominance of sovereign bilateralism all
render it a system which is immature and frequently ineffective. Thus,
the teleology of Article 31(3)(c) cannot be limited to the simple preservation of the system's integrity; it follows that the article should also
make a positive contribution towards its further integration. The term
"systemic integration" is thus not static-it calls for evolution.
That said, that Article 31 (3)(c) of the VCLT was originally intended 3'
to serve as a means by which to foster the inter-temporal rejuvenation of
35.
Contra Isabelle Van Damme, Some Observations About the ILC Study Group Report on the Fragmentation of International Law: WTO Treaty Interpretation Against the
Background of Other InternationalLaw, 2006 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 21, 27 (arguing that the

aim of ILC was to clarify rather than to suggest priority in the application of Article 31(3)(c)).
36.
See DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 607 (Jean Salmon ed., 2001)
(describing systemic interpretation in international law as a method of interpretation, making
reference to the whole institutional and normative organization of the international community).
For a thorough analytical overview of the drafting history of Article 31(3)(c) within
37.
the ILC and beyond, see Panos Merkouris, Debating the Ouroboros of InternationalLaw: The
Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c), 9 INT'L COMMUNITY L. REv. 1 (2007).
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39
treaty provisions comes as no surprise. 3' As its travaux priparatoires
show, the issue was debated in great depth and the initial version of the
document-which provided that treaties should be interpreted in the
light of the law in force at the time of their drafting-was abandoned. By
leaving out the Fitzmaurician principle of contemporaneity, the final version of the VCLT managed to omit the temporal factor. What was finally
decided was "to transfer this element of interpretation to paragraph 3 [of
Article 31] as being an element which is extrinsic both to the text and to
the 'context.' ,0That is, although the reference in subparagraph (3)(c) to
"any relevant rules of international law" is less explicit, it seems wide
enough to embrace those norms that were not applicable at the time of
conclusion of a treaty.4' Subsequent developments that were not initially
envisaged by the parties 2 can thus, by way of Article 31(3)(c), be integrated into a judge's
rationale and therefore become applicable at the
• 43
time of interpretation.
Yet, the idea of interpreting a special instrument in light of the evolution taking place within the broader international legal order is
reminiscent of another interpretative method. Inter-temporality is inseparably linked to the dynamic or evolutive (the two terms treated in this
Article as synonymous) method of interpretation, which calls for the interpretation of a norm in accordance with any evolution that occurred
38.
See RICHARD K. GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 251-56 (2008).
39.
See THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: TRAVAUX PRtPARATORIES 244-49 (Dietrich Rauschning ed., 1978) [hereinafter VCLT TRAVAUX PRtPARATOiRES];
see also Jan Klabbers, Reluctant Grundnormen:Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, in TIME, HISTORY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 141, 143-48 (58 Developments in International Law, Matthew

Craven et al. eds., 2007) (providing a very comprehensive review of the drafting history of
Article 31(3)(c)).
40.
VCLT TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES, supra note 39, at 254.
41.
Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special
Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 318, 330 (1969).

42.

See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

140 (2d

ed. 1973) (insisting that it "must always be on condition that such an evolutionary interpretation does not conflict with the intentions and expectations of the parties as they may have been
expressed during the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the treaty"). The accent is
placed clearly onto the volonti of the contracting parties. See id. But see V. Cmic-Grotic, Object and Purposeof Treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1997 ASIAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 141, 165 (explaining that the evolutive interpretation is understood as a method "satisfying new needs which were not foreseen originally by the parties" and falls under the
broader teleological technique of interpretation) (citation omitted).
43.
See SINCLAIR, supra note 42, at 139 (arguing that "a treaty may retain in force for
many years, and ...international law may evolve and develop during the period when the
treaty is in force" and that "[t]here is some evidence that the evolution and development of
international law may exercise a decisive influence on the meaning to be given to expressions
incorporated in a treaty, particularly if these expressions themselves denote relative or evolving notions").
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within the court's respective legal system since the enactment of the
44

norm.44

Thus, one could argue that Article 31(3)(c) is much more than an
apparatus enabling the interpreter of a special instrumentum of international law to read its norms in light of third (that is to say, extraneous)
relevant sources-stemming from both general 5 and inter-subjective or
special46 international law. While definitely offering this option, Article
31(3)(c) does so in a broader, inter-temporal frame. Hence, the interpretation of a treaty "cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent
development of law" and "has to be interpreted and applied within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation."' Again, a treaty "is not
' 48 static, and is open to adapt to
emerging norms of international law.
Nonetheless, to be fair to the ILC, one must recognize that its report,
which apparently calls a well-known tool (dynamic or evolutive method
of interpretation) by a new name (systemic integration technique), it
makes special reference to the inter-temporal dimension of Article
31(3)(c). 49 However, the ILC has chosen to examine the inter-temporality
44.

See the similar definition provided by the

DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

supra note 36, at 605. As Jean Marc Sorel explains, most of the time, the other interpretative techniques are proven to be sufficient and, therefore, reference to general
international law by the means of Article 31(3)(c) becomes pertinent mostly for the purposes
of dynamic interpretation, which aims to take into account the evolution of international law
in general. Sorel, supra note 8, at 1323.
45.
See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 182 (Nov. 6) (refusing to accept,
after making explicit reference to Article 31(3)(c), that the bilateral treaty between two adverse parties "was intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of
international law on the use of force" and holding that "[t]he application of the relevant rules
of international law relating to this question... forms an integral part of the task of interpretation entrusted to the Court").
46.
See Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008
I.C.J. 37 (June 4), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/136/14550.pdf (last visited
Mar. 26, 2010). The court resorted to Article 31(3)(c) in order to refer to an old bilateral treaty
of friendship between Djibouti and France. Id. 1 112-14. The convention over which the
dispute between these two states arose was interpreted in the light of that treaty of friendship.
PUBLIC,

Id.
47.
Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 32-33 (June 21).
48.
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 68 (Sept. 25). Nevertheless, it is important to mention that the court applied the dynamic method of
interpretation only after having established that doing so was within the intentions of the parties to the treaty-that is, "by inserting .. . evolving provisions in the Treaty, the parties
recognized the potential necessity to adapt the Project." Id. at 67.
49.
ILC, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, $ 251(4)(22), U.N. Doc. A/61/10
(Oct. 1, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 ILC Report] ("International law is a dynamic legal system. A
treaty may convey whether in applying Article 31(3)(c) the interpreter should refer only to
rules of international law in force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty or may also take
into account subsequent changes in the law. Moreover, the meaning of a treaty provision may
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issue as a "special question"' of systemic integration. This choice would
appear to reveal the ILC's understanding about the relationship between
the two methods of interpretation: it seems to conceive of the dynamism
of the international system in evolving towards deeper integration as an
exclusively unidirectional process. Special regimes are meant to be interpreted in light of international law so that their effects are in harmony
with the system of the latter. Otherwise they risk contributing to fragmentation and thus impede further integration. According to this
approach, because of the risk of fragmentation, a stop should be put to
any forces of evolution stemming from the special regimes or from normative systems other than the international one that might possibly affect
these special regimes. By the same token, the evolution that derives from
the special regimes' practice has to be deprived of any potential to affect
the already crystallized norms of general international law. For Article
31(3)(c) to successfully promote systemic integration during diachronic
evolution of the normative environment without allowing fragmentation,
the systemic center must be either robust enough to remain intact despite
changes taking place within special regimes (which would mean that
fragmentation was a non-issue) or else static and therefore, by definition,
unaffected by such changes. As we all know very well, this is not the
case of international law.
If we accept that this last point is valid, we must also accept that
evolutive interpretation may move in the other direction: that is, rather
than going hand-in-hand with systemic integration, the evolutive/dynamic technique may also be proven (if evolution originates
"inland" from the specialized regimes) to cause (temporary) fragmentation. If this is right, then these two techniques of interpretation may
theoretically both diverge and converge. Yet it is only in the scenario of
convergence that Article 31(3)(c) indeed operates, as the title of this
chapter suggests, as a servitore di due padroni. This is a presumption
that should be tested in the case law of the ECtHR. However, before engaging in this intellectual exercise, it is important to offer an overview of
the specialty of the ECHR and of the margin of discretion recognized to
its interpreters either to place emphasis on the sui generis socionormative nature of its teleology or to proceed with a less constitutional
reading and, thereby, to give priority to the (highly voluntarist) economy
of the international legal system within which the Convention is situated.

also be affected by subsequent developments, especially where there are subsequent develop-

ments in customary law and general principles of law.").
50.
475-78.

ILC, Final Report on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, supra note 28,

461,
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II.

INTERPRETING THE

ECHR:

PLURALISM

WITHIN A DUALIST DtCOR

A. The Dualist Confines of Pluralism in the Means of Interpretation
As has been ingeniously suggested, treaty interpretation appeals to
the spirit of finesse more than to the spirit of geometry."' The contrast
between these two concepts is strong and the message for the judge quite
clear. Selectivity in methods of interpretation, although forbidden by the
strict rules of geometry, is acceptable when necessary to a particular outcome. All the same, even when a judge aspires to interpret subtly, she
does not have carte blanche in doing so. Much as deviating from geometric rules may result in mistaken conclusions, dexterous approaches to
interpreting legal documents may be over-fussy, if not downright clumsy; the legitimacy of the interpretation can ultimately be assessed only
by the final result-that is, whether this result is just and reasonable.
If it is accepted that a judge possesses a right (competence) to make
judicial choices, she "cannot be regarded as having a purely neutral role
as discoverer and enforcer of the law but as being an active participant."'5 2
This notion of choice arms the judge with considerable liberty of action
both to self-restrain her powers, as long as this does not end up in a denial of justice, and to move beyond the letter of the law, as long as this
does not result in judicial activism in the sense of a metamorphosis of
the norm. All the same, the concepts of both denial of justice and activism are substantially vague and broad, leading inevitably to subjective
opinions on whether judicial interpretation respects the limits set by
these two extremes. The dividing line between legislating and adjudicating is always fine. Without entering into a discussion of the definition of
these concepts, the thesis promoted by this Article is that, within the fragile boundaries of judicial competence, each and every judge is free to
select the reasoning that seems to her most appropriate and persuasive in
order to support the outcome that both the law and her conscience suggest in a given moment, with reference to the particular social
environment that gave birth to the conflict. Consequently, judicial discretion includes both the final outcome of the decision as well as the means
for its support. It also implies the existence of pluralism among interpretative tools, not all of which necessarily produce identical solutions.
Hence, a judge demonstrates selectiveness when she excludes those tools

PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 264 (7th ed.
51.
2002).
52.
Paul Mahoney, JudicialActivism and JudicialSelf-Restraint in the European Court
of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HuM. RTS. L.J. 57, 60 (1990).
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that do not support the outcome that she considers just or that do not promote the values, objectives, or necessities to which she gives priority.
Focusing then on the example of the ECtHR, the Strasbourg Court
often integrates in its reasoning "different arguments ... read in [such] a
way that they are channeled toward a common interpretation. 53 These
diverse arguments, corresponding to respective interpretative techniques
that have been selected among other available ones, are employed in a
cumulative and converging way, so that the court's judgment presents the
fullest possible justification. In order for the ECtHR to implement this
kind of pluralistic interpretative operation, it makes use of a toolbox containing a set of both the well-known methods (the classic international
law interpretative tools) and certain others specific to its regime. 4
The point of departure for judicial interpretation can be none other
than the law, that is, the text of the ECHR. A textual analysis focuses on
the wording of the Convention and aims at investigating the literal meaning of its language." Self-evidently, this technique is closely related to a
second technique, which focuses on the will of contracting parties 6 The
ECHR negotium, as reflected in the text of the Convention, is the product
of the volontg of its signatory parties. Since its normativity stems from
state will, voluntarist positivism requires that the Convention neither be
given an effect against this volonti, nor produce results that were originally meant to be excluded. Thus reference to its travaux prparatoires
may prove particularly helpful in shedding light on the original intentions of the parties 7
53.
Mark Toufayan, "Human Rights," "Speciality" in Interpretation and the Anxieties
of Violence 34 (2005) (on file with author); see also Mark Toufayan, Human Rights Treaty
Interpretation:A Postmodern Account of Its Claim to "Specialty", at iii (Ctr. Hum. Rts. &
Global Justice, Working Paper No. 2, 2005), available at http://www.chrgj.org/publications/
docs/wp/0502%20Toufayan.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Toufayan, Human
Rights Treaty Interpretation](providing a shorter version of Toufayan's study).
54.
See the classification of the methods of interpretation of the ECtHR proposed by
Olivier De Schutter, L'Interprdtationde la Convention Europienne des Droits de L'Homme:
Un Essai en Demolition, 70 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES
ET POLITIQUEs 83 (1992).
55.
See, for example, the argument that the court made concerning the question of
euthanasia in Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-If1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 186 (holding that the right
to life "cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically

opposite right, namely a right to die").
56.
See, e.g., Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1979)
(holding that "[i]t would clearly be contrary to the intention of the drafters of the Convention
to hold that a restriction imposed by virtue of the common law is not 'prescribed by law' on
the sole ground that it is not enunciated in legislation").
57.
See, e.g., James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 14, 39-40 (1986)
("Confronted with a text whose interpretation has given rise to such disagreement, the Court
considers it proper to have recourse to the travauxpreparatoiresas a supplementary means of

interpretation.").
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Moreover, nothing prevents the court from "delegating" its authority
as ultimate interpreter of the Convention to national courts, allowing
them to exercise a margin of appreciation" to define a term of the Convention at the domestic level, in accordance with the premises, legal
traditions, sensitivities, and particular values dominant within the respective national legal orders. In so doing, there is a strong presumption that
a national judge is not only better situated to translate, through case law,
the prevailing societal understanding over a given question of human
rights protection at any given moment, but also that, since her state's
courts form part of a particular democratic society and its legal order,
she is better positioned to construe the current majoritarian will of its
executive.
Against the voluntarist reading of the Convention, one can juxtapose
the constitutional, or objectivist, interpretation and the plethora of means
that an ECtHR judge possesses that allows the ECHR to effectuate its
humanistic and integrational objectives. If the advantages of the margin
of appreciation method are flexibility, pluralism, and respect for the particularities of different societies, the aim of the diametrically opposite
technique-that is, autonomous interpretation 59-is to ensure that cultural diversity and polyphony will not turn the European public order
into Babel. Within the European sub-system, the tempo is set by the
judges of Strasbourg. Thus, it is for these latter to choose when a term of
the Convention should be given one single pan-European definition, irrespective of the content that it was given by domestic courts. For the
ECHR to successfully establish common standards of human rights protection, consolidate its public order, and speak with one single voice to
all the domestic orders of its signatory parties, its lexicon must be unified, common, and distinctive. Besides, the ECHR regime itself
corresponds to an integrated and highly centralized system and, as such,
it can only accommodate polyphony to the extent that this does not
threaten to fragment it.
Going beyond the objective of uniformity, one interesting argument
in favor of an ECtHR as "ultimate interpreter" of the ECHR is that, like
all others, European society is subject to evolution. Although in doing so
58.
See, e.g., Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1986). This
case concerned whether the respondent state had an obligation to adopt positive measures
conferring on the applicant, a transsexual, legal status corresponding to his new sexual identity. Recognizing that, in the absence of consensus on the issue, states enjoy a "wide margin of
appreciation" to regulate this type of question at the domestic level, the ECtHR abstained from
drawing a common standard at pan-European level and rather granted states the competence to
regulate and/or adjudicate the issue at the domestic level. Id.
59.
See Oztiirk v. Germany, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1984); Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 (1976).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 31:621

it evidently risks diluting the original will of states, 60 the court often recalls that the Convention is a "living instrument which must be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions., 6' Given the dual nature of the ECHR as a classic international treaty and a special
instrument for the establishment and further integration of a regional
public order, these present-day conditions may well take into account the
socio-normative evolution occurring within both62 the international legal
order (through Article 31(3)(c) VCLT)63 and the domestic orders of the
member statesi 4
The juxtaposition of the various available methods of interpretation
could continue to follow the same antithetic schema and to evidence the
fact that the ECtHR is perfectly able both to maintain the original will of
the contracting parties65 and to diverge from it. The reason for divergence
would have remained unclear had the Strasbourg Court not highlighted
the special aim and purpose of the ECHR and suggested that it was its
drafters' intention to endow it with such a telos.6 The character of the
Convention resembles that of a "constitutional instrument of European
public order.' 67' Due, finally, to its special nature,68 the ECHR telos re60.
Cf Frederic Sudre, A Propos du Dynamisme lnterpretatifde la Cour Europdenne
des Dmits de l'Homme, 28 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE tDITION GgNtRALE 1365 (July 11, 2001)
(arguing that the evolutive method of interpretation depends in reality on states' consent).
Thus, according to Sudre, the truly "dynamic" reading of the ECHR relies primarily on methods of interpretation other than the "consensual-evolutive" one.
61.
Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1995) (decision on the preliminary objections).
62.

RAMONA TOMA, LA R9ALITt JUDICIAIRE DE LA COUR EUROPtENNE DES DROITS DE

L'HOMME: ACTIVISME ET RETENUE JUDICIAIREs 56-61 (2003).

63.
See the case law presented in Part IIlA.1, infra.
64.
See, e.g., 'Iyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15-16 (1978) (judgment on
the merits) ("In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by the developments
and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of member States... in this field.").
65.
See George Letsas, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 58-72 (2007) (objecting to the voluntarist reading of the

Convention, which the author defines as "intentionalism").
66.
Hence, since "[i]t is clear from the Preamble to the Convention that the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention intended ...to take steps for the collective
enforcement of the rights and ... that the purpose.., was 'to establish a common public order
of the free democracies of Europe,'" its teleology cannot be other than the effective protection
of the rights it enumerates. Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou & Loizidou v. Turkey, App.
Nos. 15299/89, 15300/89, 15318/89, 68 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 216, 241-42, 20
(1991) (decision as to the admissibility) (quoting Austria v. Italy, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Cony. H.R.
116, 138 (Eur. Comm'n H.R.)).
67.
Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou, & Loizidou, 68 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
at 242; Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1995) decision on the preliminary
objections).
68.
The ECtHR started building the idea of an international instrumentum of special
character in its very early judgments. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 5, 90 (1978) ("Unlike international treaties of the classical kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over and
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quires that it guarantee "rights that are practical and effective" 69 (that is,
it must fulfill the principle of effectiveness, or the effet utile).
B. The Dualist Confines of the Special Nature of the ECHR
The ECHR's specialty, as argued in the introduction of this Article,
is multi-level. In the first instance, the Convention is special in the sense
that its norms are deprived of general effect. Being signed and ratified by
a closed number of states, its normativity is relative, that is, it is intersubjective. However, it is on the second level of specialty that the ECtHR
relies in order to nourish its human rights teleology and, in the name of
the effectiveness of rights protection, often ranks other conflicting objectives lower, including sometimes the objective of systemic integration.
The ECHR is a special international treaty in that it protects the dignitystemming rights of the human being. It defends interests which are
common to its signatory parties and not exclusive to each of them separately. In support of the idea of a special instrumentum that is at the
service of certain common values ranked of greater importance to a particular social group, general international law offers to the substantive
norms created by such a treaty an equally special, distinct, if not virtually hierarchically 70 superior normative status.
The human rights provisions of the ECHR introduce objective obligations which are owed erga omnes partes and, in so doing, the
provisions establish a community of interests, the safeguarding of which
falls under the common responsibility of all states parties. With its 2006
final Report on Fragmentation of International Law, the ILC classified
the categories of erga omnes and erga omnes partes norms next to that
of jus cogens and examined all three under the general heading of "relations of importance., 7' However, the conclusion it reached was that

above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words
of the Preamble, benefit from a 'collective enforcement.' ").
69.
E.g., S. v. Switzerland, 220 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 16 (1991). The origins of the
principle of effectiveness can be found in Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
Ever since, the principle has served as the basis for building a pro homine case law on a number of issues, including the positive or quasi-horizontal effect of the ECHR.
70.
One cannot but refer to the famous paper by Prosper Weil criticizing the danger of
the "erosion" of "classic" intemational law by the "new" trends of, inter alia,jus cogens and
erga omnes. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J.
INT'L

L. 413 (1983). Among several other works on the hierarchy of norms, see Juan Antonio

Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy in InternationalLaw, 8 EUR. J.

L. 583 (1997); J.H.H. Weiler & Andreas L. Paulus, The Structure of Change in InternaINT'L L. 545
(1997).
71.
ILC, Final Report on Fragmentationof InternationalLaw, supra note 28, IN324409.
INT'L

tional Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in InternationalLaw?, 8 EUR. J.
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[o]bligations erga omnes are different from Article 103 of the
United Nations Charter and jus cogens. Whereas the latter are
distinguished by their normative power-their ability to override
a conflicting norm-obligations erga omnes designate the scope
of application of the relevant law, and the procedural consequences that follow from this. . .. The erga omnes nature of an
obligation ... indicates no clear superiority of that obligation
over other obligations. Although in practice norms recognized as
having an erga omnes validity set up undoubtedly important obligations, this importance does not translate into a hierarchical
superiority similar to that of Article 103 andjus cogens.""
Thus, the ILC considered it important to emphasize
the clear difference that exists between jus cogens norms and obligations as erga omnes. The former have to do with the
normative "weight" of a norm, the latter with its procedural
"scope." While a jus cogens norm has necessarily an erga omnes
scope, not all erga omnes obligations have weight as jus co73
gens.
However, the counter-argument against such a conservative approach
highlights that the principal procedural consequences of the erga omnes
and, mutatis mutandis, erga omnes partes norms,74 described by the ILC
as the procedural scope of application,are not a "scope", that is to say an
objective per se; after all, that procedural effect is not born ex nihilo but
rather is a rational, self-operative consequence stemming from the fact
that these norms-by definition-incorporate values ranked of high importance by the international community. The reason indeed why these
obligations are owed erga omnes (and thereby require collective enforcement) is because they incorporate values bearing substantial moral

72.
73.

Id. 1380.
Id. 1408.

74.
See ILC, Draft Resolution: Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, art. 48(1), U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.20 (Nov. 12, 2001) [hereinafter ILC Norms on State
Responsibility]. The Resolution provides:
Invocation of responsibility by a State other than an injured State:
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of
another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: (a) The obligation breached is
owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for the protection
of a collective interest of the group; or (b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.
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weight for the community as a whole." Recognizing this, this Article
argues that the material scope-and not the procedural consequencesof the value-stemming objectives promoted by the erga omnes norms
call for the recognition of their normative superiority vis-a-vis the classic
bilateral or bilateralizable norms of international law.
However, the effect of the primacy described here does not mirror
that of jus cogens; erga omnes norms are neither absolute nor nonderogable. Moreover, they cannot generate the nullifying effect of peremptory norms. The normative weight of erga omnes obligations simply
implies that priority should be given to their fulfillment. However, if a
non-erga omnes norm conflicted with an erga omnes norm, the normative force of each would remain intact in abstracto,but the first would be
allowed to produce its results only to the extent that it did not disproportionately impede the effect of the erga omnes obligation. Unlike jus
cogens, erga omnes norms are susceptible to exceptions and limitations ;76 however, these exceptions and limitations are allowed on the
precondition that they respect the exigencies of proportionality. The role
of this precondition is central to priority setting, to the balancing of conflicting objectives, and to measuring the extent to which the effect of a
given erga omnes norm may be limited. The legality of the limitations is
to be decided ad hoc, after taking into account the context and the particular circumstances of each case.
Finally, even if one wanted to follow the ILC's procedural approach
and neglect the material dimension of the erga omnes norms, it would be
difficult to imagine how two states' (bilateral) law-making powers could
supersede obligations they owe vis-a-vis a much broader circle of subjects-unless of course their bilateral (or bilateralizable) results were not
per se incompatible with or disproportionate to their erga omnes obligations.
75.
See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
318 (2006) (arguing that "obligations erga omnes have specific and broad procedural consequences because of the substantive importance of the norms they enunciate"); see also
Questions Relating to Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.) (Order of May 28,
2009) (Trindade, J., dissenting), 71, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/144/
15154.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (emphasizing the values protected by obligations erga
omnes as the source of their special status); MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 202-03 (1997). Contra Alain Pellet, Conclusions, in THE
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 418 (Christian Tomuschat &
Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006); IAN D. SEIDERMAN, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE HUMAN RIGHTS DIMENSION 125 (2001).
76.
See Pieter van Dijk, The Status of International Treaties on Human Rights: The
Hierarchy of Rules of InternationalLaw, Venice Commission, in THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 222-24 (2006) (contending that both erga omnes and
jus cogens have a higher rank than other rules of international law and, unlike jus cogens,
obligations erga ones are not absolute, but contain an "absolutecore").
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The ECHR is, therefore, as "special" as any other human rights treaty that establishes obligations erga omnes partes that reflect values
common to all of its contracting parties. The substantive international
obligations deriving from it are owed vis-t-vis the whole community of
parties and the safeguarding of their material content falls under common responsibility. Due to its erga omnes partes nature the ECHR
recognizes the legitimate interest of each and every state party in reacting to violations, regardless of whether it is directly affected by the
breach." Intentionally designed as a non-synallagmatic agreement, the
ECHR squarely excludes reciprocity. Last but not least, as a consequence of these special characteristics and, mainly, due to the material
humanistic scope of its provisions, the Convention's substantive provisions require that a certain (non-absolute) priority be given to their
fulfillment, as against other conflicting bilateral or bilateralizable obligations.
The ECHR's specialty is not, however, limited only to the normative
quality of its substantive provisions. At the third and last level, its special
normative effects are expected to be produced within an equally special
socio-political context. If general international law is the matrix which
gave birth to the ECHR, the European continent is the arena in which it
produces its effect and the idea of European integration is its raison
d'tre. The geographical, economic, social, and political confines of Europe-a social unit marked by the bitter experiences of its past and
inspired by a common understanding of certain values-delimit not only
its normative, but primarily its practical and effective limits. Within this
space, the ECHR functions as an instrument of constitutional weight,
designed for the anthropocentric integration of a rather homogeneous
regional group, which despite its inherent diversity is far more integrated
and compact than the broader universal system.
Certainly, pluralism in its methods of interpretation has neither excluded nor precluded "the emergence of a specific 'human rights ethos'
or even a 'European human rights tradition' 7,8 elevated to a European
public order. Equally, however, it cannot be argued that pluralism alone
guarantees balance between the "musts" of a document reflecting the
logic of a human fights regional quasi-constitution and the "oughts" of a
multilateral treaty forming part and parcel of international law. At the
same time, neither does pluralism prohibit such a balance. Thus, no matter how rich the interpretative arsenal of an ECtHR judge is, she is
77.
"Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and the protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party."
ECHR, supra note 3, art. 33; see ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art.

48(1)(a).
78.

Toufayan, Human Rights Treaty Interpretation, supra note 53, at 21.
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forced to adapt its use to the logic, conditions, and exigencies of the dualist nature of the ECHR, which can be schematized by the following
three antithetic ideas: (1) subjective will of the states versus objective
pro homine telos; (2) integration of the Convention into the broader international system versus the constitutional specialty of its regional
system; and (3) integration of the broader international system versus the
integration of the European public order.
Having dealt with this, the way is now open to examine how Article
31(3)(c) of the VCLT takes effect within the confines of this contradictory, multidimensional, dualistic d6cor.
III. THE USE OF ARTICLE 31(3)(c) IN
ECTHR

CASE LAW

Having concluded the theoretical part of the study, the section that
follows is devoted to an analysis of the practice of the ECtHR, with the
aim of testing the validity of the presumptions that have been outlined so
far. It goes without saying that although, in principle, the court proceeds
proprio motu in controlling the suitability of the systemic integration
method of interpretation (or, as this Article argues, selects it79 among the
other interpretive techniques available), there is nothing to prevent the

79.
See, e.g., Andrejeva v. Latvia, App. No. 55707/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 18, 2009)
(Ziemele, partly dissenting)
15-17. In this interesting partial dissent, Judge Ziemele accuses the court of applying the Convention "in isolation from international law." Id. The
applicant, no longer a citizen of any state, alleged that the respondent state had discriminated
against her in refusing to grant her a pension for her employment in the former Soviet Union
prior to 1991 on the ground that she did not have Latvian citizenship. According to Judge
Ziemele, the court should have first determined-through systemic integration-whether, in
terms of international law, the respondent state succeeded or not to the obligations of the Soviet Union in the field of social rights. Id.
17-21. Apparently, for Judge Ziemele, the
answer to this question constituted a preliminary condition for the Convention to apply. Nevertheless, although admittedly not as explicitly as could be desirable, the court made a very
strong point concerning its refusal to resort to the norms of international law over state succession. According to its argument, even assuming that the respondent state did not succeed the
former Soviet Union as to this specific obligation, "the conclusion that has to be drawn in this
case would be unaffected: where a State decides of its own accord to pay pensions to individuals in respect of periods of employment outside its territory, thereby creating a sufficiently
clear legal basis in its domestic law, the presumed entitlement to such benefits falls within the
scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1." Id. 78 (judgment). Hence, while international law did
not require the respondent state to grant a pension to the applicant for her work under the
Soviet regime, once it had decided unilaterally and voluntarily to provide pension to individuals under its jurisdiction, it had to do so non-discriinatorily. Id. 90. The legal basis for the
applicant's entitlement finds its source in domestic law. Yet, interpreted in the light of the
European public order, this entitlement acquires the effect of a "quasi-unilateral act."
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parties to the conflict from calling for an interpretation of the Convention in the light of the norms of international law relevant to their case.' °
This Article argues that this case law can be classified by the role
that ECtHR judges have given to Article 31(3(c) with regard to the
standing of ECHR norms vis-li-vis the broader system into which they
are expected to harmonically integrate. The suggested taxonomy requires
assessing the use of Article 31(3)(c) at two levels: (A) its effect on normative aspects of systemic integration, and (B) this effect on institutional
aspects of systemic integration.
Within this first categorization, further analysis is necessary: the Article argues in Part III.A that there are three distinct scenarios in which
the ECtHR might use Article 31(3)(c), including when:
(1) the norms of the ECHR are complementary to the extraneous
relevant norms of international law;
(2) the Conventions' norms conflict with other norms of international law; and
(3) the norms of international law are ratione materiae irrelevant
to the ECHR subject matter, and are such that the ECtHR
must resort to in order to answer a preliminary question that is
necessary for its regime to produce effects.

80.
For examples of cases in which the parties invoked Article 31(3)(c) on their own
initiative, see, inter alia Markovic v. Italy, App. No. 1398/03, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 52, 1045,
1078 (2007). In this case, the court had to decide whether there had been a violation of the
right of access to justice (Article 6 of the ECHR). The applicants, victims of the use of force
by NATO against the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, alleged that they had suffered a
denial of justice when Italy refused to examine on the merits Applicant's tort action for damages under international and domestic law. Id. T 100. In order for the ECtHR to decide
whether the respondent state violated the right of access to justice, it first had to decide
whether the international law norms on which the applicants founded their claim for reparation supported such an action. Id. [ 100-02, 108-09. The validation of the domestic courts'
practice came only after the court proceeded with its own interpretation of these international
norms. Id. 1 109. This case would be classified in the third of the categories discussed later in
this Article (those that resort to international law for preliminary questions of applicability of
the ECHR). See also Carlson v. Switzerland, App. No. 49492/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 6, 2008)
(judgment on the merits). This case concerned child abduction. While alleging a violation of
his right to family life under Article 8 of the ECHR, the applicant called on the court to interpret Article 8 in light of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98. Id. 57-60. Via Article
31(3)(c), the court introduced the named Hague Convention into its reasoning, and read Article 8 of the ECHR in the light of its provisions. Id. 69-82. Interestingly, certain parts of the
court's judgment give the impression that, by incorporating the Hague Convention into Article
8, it applied the Hague Convention in substance. The application of the systemic integration
technique in Carlson would fall into the first of the three categories proposed in this Article
(complementary norms).
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For the Article to be consistent with the questions that have been
raised in the introduction8 ' and with the consequent presumptions that
were released in Parts I and II, it must investigate the role of Article
31(3)(c) not only as an anti-fragmentation tool but also as a mechanism
enabling the evolutive (dynamic) reading of the ECHR. As Part III.A
explains, theoretically Article 31(3)(c) may be used evolutionarily in
each of the three aforementioned normative scenarios, that is, in the face
of complementarity, conflict of norms, and preliminary questions falling
outside the ECHR's subject matter: under this hypothesis, the dynamic
interpretation falls into the broader scope of systemic integration, the
two methods converge and the latter absorbs the former. However, the
empirical data collected from the case law of the ECtHR suggest that, in
fact, the court relies (both tacitly and explicitly) on the dynamic/evolutive dimension of Article 31(3)(c) only in the first
scenario-that is, only when there is complementarity between ECHR
and extraneous norms. As such, the method of dynamic interpretation is
juxtaposed against that of systemic integration only in cases in which
norms are complementary. What will be demonstrated is that systemic
integration and evolutive interpretative approaches both converge and
diverge.
Nevertheless, the three scenarios that cover potential systemic integration of normative aspects through ECtHR case law must be
distinguished from those involved at the second level, concerning potential institutional fragmentation. Part III.B discusses the rather sui
generis, so far exceptional, and arguably abusive role that the ECtHR has
assigned to Article 31(3)(c) in inhibiting institutional fragmentation in
cases presenting characteristics of a prevailingly institutional and nonnormative consistency. Of course, the classifications proposed here do
not claim to be exhaustive or absolute.
A. Normative Aspects
1. The Complementary Role of International Law:
Pseudo-Systemic Integration?
In assessing the effect of Article 31(3)(c) as an anti-fragmentation
tool, the first scenario to be examined is the ECtHR's introduction into
its reasoning-by way of Article 31(3)(c)-of extraneous and relevant
norms of international law that are ratione materiae complementary to
81. Those include, to recall: (1) How effective can Article 31(3)(c) be as a remedy against
the fragmentation of international law? (2) To what extent may the Article accommodate techniques of interpretation other than that of systemic integration? And (3), how should the
relationship between these distinct interpretative methods be conceptualized?
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its Convention. Before proceeding with a critical analysis of the relevant
case law, it worth noting that although the ECtHR appears to apply Article 31(3)(c) (explicitly or implicitly) most frequently among
international courts, the literature discussing this phenomenon is somewhat inadequate. Unsurprisingly, with the exception of some recent
works,82 most authors83 describe the relevant case law as examples of
evolutive (dynamic) interpretation and not systemic integration. The
most plausible explanation for this is that the idea of Article 31(3)(c) in
the service of the unity of the system was introduced by the ILC only
very recently.
Another partial explanation relates to the fact that, as will be shown
infra, systemic integration and evolutionary techniques arguably often
pursue contiguous objectives-which also explains the challenges of
organizing the relevant case law into categories. In this connection, this
Article argues that when the two techniques of systemic integration for
the purposes of normative complementarity and evolution converge, the
sole criteria that determine whether the court classifies a case as one or
the other are (1) the wording that the court uses and (2) whether or not it
intends to emphasize the evolution. Obviously, when both methods of
interpretation are based upon Article 3 1(3)(c) of the VCLT, the interest in
distinguishing them is primarily academic. Yet the fact that the dividing
line is subtle provides proof that the two techniques, although distinct
and motivated by different goals, converge and have much in common.
The analysis that follows concerns the cases where first, the court has
put the accent on integration, and second, the instances where it emphasized evolution.
a. Emphasizing Integration
i. Opening the Convention to the Broader System in Order to
Complement Its "Incomplete" Text: Substantive Aspects
This section considers the ECtHR's use of systemic integration in
instances of complementarity between the ECHR and international law.
The example par excellence in that category of cases is the famous
Golder judgment,M which assessed whether the right to access to justice,
82.
McLachlan, supra note 34, at 296; see also GARDINER, supra note 38, at 284-85
(describing the function of Article 31 (3)(c) in this category of cases as "[flilling gaps by reference to general international law").
83.
See, e.g., Giorgio Gaja, Does the European Court of Human Rights Use Its Stated
Methods of Interpretation?,in I DIVENIRE SOCIALE E ADEGUAMENTO DEL DIRITrO: STUDI IN
ONORE Di FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI 213, 219-20 (1999); Soren C. Prebensen, Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 1123, 1124-26 (Paul Mahoney et al. eds. 2000).

84.

Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 5 (1975).
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although not mentioned expressis verbis, falls within the scope of protection offered by Article 6 of the ECHR. To support its affirmative reply,
the ECtHR advanced reasoning that combined several methods of interpretation (text, context, object, and purpose),85 including that of systemic
integration. 6 In so doing, it explicitly referred to Article 31(3)(c) VCLT,
explaining that
the principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being
submitted to a judge ranks as one of the universally "recognised" fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the
principle of international law which forbids the denial of justice.
Article 6 § 1 must be read in the light of these principles."
Evidently, Article 6 of the ECHR and the two principles of international law to which the court referred are ratione materiae relevant.
While it is true that the jurisdiction of the ECtHR exclusively concerns
the Convention and its text, by resorting to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT,
the court managed to open the treaty to the broader legal system and,
thereby, to read its text in light of the principles prevailing in this broader
system. Although the systemic integration function of Article 31 (3)(c) in
the Golder case (presumably) was successful, arguably it operated more
as a bottom-up than a top-down process, which resulted in the integration of the international legal order into the ECHR. To explain this
argument further: while the court prima facie aligned the Convention
with the general principles of international law and, accordingly, the
former seemingly evolved in such a way as to integrate harmonically
within the broader system, integration was not the objective per se of the
ECtHR. It is clear from the court's reasoning and its converging,
cumulative use of several interpretative techniques that the court's ultimate aim was to reinforce the humanistic telos of the Convention and to
broaden its semantic field in such a way as to maximize the protection
offered. When the operation of Article 31(3)(c) is viewed from this perspective, the systemic integration effect is transformed into a simple
collateral benefit. If, beyond integration (to the extent that integration is
really achieved), the use of the systemic integration technique would not
have advanced the objectives of the Convention as a human rights
85.
For an overview, see Mark E. Villiger, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in INTERNATIONALE GEMEINSCHAFT UND MENSCHENRECHTE: FESTSCHRIFT FOR GEORG RESS 317, 319

(2005).
86.

It is interesting to note that, for Rudolf Bernhardt, the Golderjudgment is a glob-

ally evolutive one. See Rudolf Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 1999 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 11, 17-18.

87.

Golder, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (set. A) at 17.
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("special") treaty, this technique would have definitely been omitted. The
aim and purpose of the ECHR are reinforced in the name of (and by way
of) the international legal order and its principles; in practice, the systemic integration objective operates as a supplement to the teleology of
the Convention.
Arguably, in the case of complementarity between the ECtHR and
the relevant norms of international law, instead of proper and full integration-in the sense that the ILC, at least, perceives it-the primary
reason why Article 31(3)(c) is establishing bridges between the Convention and international law is that the former benefits from the latter
through absorption of normative elements which, although absent from
its "imperfect" text, are both complementary and necessary for the effective promotion of its special scopes.88 That Article 3 1(c)(3) has a pseudosystemic integration effect does not come as a surprise; rather, it flows as
the logical consequence of the fact that normative complementarity can
hardly ever cause fragmentation. Accordingly, in the absence of any risk
of fragmentation, it is impossible for the systemic integration technique
to produce any genuine anti-fragmentation effect. Not only does its use
then come free of cost for the Strasbourg Court, but it also offers a number of significant advantages: it generously provides the court with
valuable normative "loans," offers judges an opportunity to appear
greatly respectful of general international law, and thereby increases the
legitimacy of judgments which, like Golder, would otherwise be widely
accused of activist tendencies.8 9
88.
The case law of the ECtHR also contains examples where extraneous norms, complementary to the ECHR and introduced into the Court's reasoning by way of systemic
integration, did not result in a broadening of the pro homine effect of the Convention. In Saadi
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13229/03, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 17, 427 (2008), the applicant, an
asylum seeker, alleged that his provisional detention while he awaited the local authorities'
decision on his refugee status application violated Article 5(1) of the Convention. The court
noted that Article 5(1)(f) of the ECHR provides an exception explicitly permitting states to
detain aliens in an immigration context and held that the effect to be given to that exception
should also cover asylum seekers-thus, as long as a state respects all other conditions emanating from Article 5, asylum seekers may be legally detained until the state authorizes entry.
In reaching that conclusion, the court considered instruments of international law (and soft
law) that are complementary to Article 5(l)(f) of the ECHR. Saadi, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 427,
449. Evidently, the outcome of systemic integration in Saadi did not reinforce the human
rights teleology of the Convention. It did, however, both complement and broaden the telos of
the exception of Article 5(l)(f), the raison d'9tre of which is apparently to limit the effect of
the general prohibition of the illegal deprivation of liberty. Hence, here again a pseudosystemic integration technique reinforced the text of the ECHR. The reason why it did not
equally lead to a reinforcement of the humanistic object and purpose of the Convention is
simply because the very object and purpose of the exception established by Article 5(l)(f) is to
limit the effect of Article 5(1).
89.
The Golder judgment was far from unanimous and was severely criticized as imposing new obligations on the parties. See, e.g., Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) 5, 24 (1975) (Verdross, J., separate opinion) (arguing that the Court's dictum failed to
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All the same, it would be a mistake to conclude from the Golder example that the sole influence on the court was general international law.
Even if the court does not rely explicitly on Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT
in all cases, its practice shows that it tends to interpret the ECHR in light
of the other sources of international law, including soft law90 and international treaties (which, by definition, have only a relative effect and
cannot be binding on the respondent state, unless the latter has duly
signed and ratified them). Nevertheless, in all these instances, the effect
of the "pseudo-systemic integration" technique is identical: Article
31(3)(c) comes into play as an accessory of the object and purpose method of interpretation and, by expanding the semantic field of the
Convention's substantive provisions, and after successfully transplanting
into it the complementary relevant norms of international law, it leads to
the reinforcement of its human rights telos.
To give just a few of many examples, in the Soering case 9' the
ECtHR twice took implicit advantage of the possibilities offered by Article 31(3)(c) VCLT. First, it did so in order to decide whether the
extradition of a person to a state where he risked the death penalty fell
into the normative frame of Article 3 of the ECHR. It noted, inter alia,
that the absolute prohibition of the conduct described by the Article was
also "found in similar terms in other international instruments such as
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
1969 American Convention on Human Rights and [was] generally recognized as an internationally accepted standard. 92 For the court, the fact
that the right not to be extradited to a state where a person might be tortured is explicitly protected by other specialized international
instruments "did not mean that an essentially similar obligation [was]

respect the exigencies of another principle of law, namely of that of legal certainty); id.at 2631 (Zekia, J., separate opinion) (giving greater importance to the intention of the parties and to
the grammatical analysis of Article 6); id.at 49-50 (Fitzmaurice, J.,
separate opinion) ("[T]he
Statute of the Council of Europe... ;the principle of the rule of law; and the 'general principles of law recognized by civilized nations' mentioned in Article 38, paragraph I (c), of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice;-all these are factors external to Article 6.1 of the
Human Rights Convention, and having little or no direct bearing on the precise point of interpretation involved ....They might be useful as straws to clutch at, or as confirmatory of a
view arrive at aliter-they are in no way determining in themselves, even taken cumulatively'") (citation omitted).
90.
Contra MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES

433 (2009) (arguing that "the term 'applicable' [in Article 31(3)(c) of

the VCLT] leaves no room for doubt: non-binding rules cannot be relied upon"). However,
these non-binding rules may be taken into consideration if they reflect the emergence of a
customary norm. For more details on the issue and examples of the various opinions that have
been expressed within the scholarship, see infra notes 103, 105, 108-109.
91.
See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
92.
Id. at 34.
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not already inherent in the general terms of Article 3. "93 Second, the
court applied Article 31(3)(c) in relation to the question of whether the
applicant's age should be of any importance to the decision of the court.
In so doing, the court gave an extensive list of international instruments
prohibiting the death penalty for minors and concluded that, even though
the ECHR did not contain such an explicit prohibition, "as a general
principle the youth of the person concerned is a circumstance which is
liable, with others, to put into question the compatibility with Article 3
of measures connected with a death sentence. 94
Likewise, in V v. United Kingdom,95 the ECtHR implicitly applied
Article 31(3)(c) twice within the same case. The second application did
not introduce any particularly innovative elements: the aim was to facilitate the court's reply to the claims of the applicant-a youth condemned
by domestic courts for the perpetration of serious offenses-that detention sentence imposed on her/him in conformity with a system specific
to the United Kingdom (detention during Her Majesty's pleasure)
breached Article 3 of the ECHR. The Strasbourg court interpreted the
Convention in light of relevant international law treaties and, notably,
soft law documents (mainly the U.N. General Assembly's "Beijing
Rules" concerning the "Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration
of Juvenile Justice") 96 to conclude that the.Convention does not prohibit
states from subjecting a child convicted of a serious crime to an indeterminate sentence.97
More interesting was the second application of Article 31(3)(c) by
the court in V v. United Kingdom. The question before the ECtHR was
whether the fact that the criminal proceedings against the minor applicant took place in public and that her/his name was published amounted
to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. Although the ECtHR silently
applied the pseudo-systemic integration technique and, through it, referred to the very same external norms as in the previous example,98 this
time it also did so from the perspective of evolution and intertemporality. The wording of the judgment placed explicit emphasis on
the evolution that had taken place over the issue in question at the international level: the court highlighted the existence of "an international
tendency in favour of the protection of the privacy of juvenile defendants" and held that "the existence of such a trend is one factor to be
93.

Id. at 35.

94.

Id. at 43,

95.

V. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24888/94, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121 (Eur. Ct. H.R.

108.

1999).
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 143-83.
Id. at 183.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30-31,

76 (1989).
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taken into account."99 Admittedly, one cannot give much weight to this
unobtrusive reference by the court to the dynamism of the relevant hard
and soft law norms. Omitting this reference would not have significantly
changed its reasoning. Its importance is, rather, of symbolical value: it
denotes that, exactly as the ILC suggests, the evolutive dimension is inherent to the systemic integration one-a position that, as will be
demonstrated infra, this paper embraces, as long, of course, as the evolution stems from the international order and not the inner world of its
special regimes.
In its recent judgment in Demir v. Turkey, the court confirmed the in-°
terrelation between systemic integration and evolutive interpretation. 0
Specifically, it explained that no matter whether a respondent state is
formally bound by the relevant instruments of international law, "[i]t will
be sufficient for the Court that [these relevant instruments of international law] denote a continuous evolution in the norms and principles
applied in international law."'O' Had the Grand Chamber of the court not
chosen this case to provide a general roadmap for the use of Article
31 (3)(c) of the VCLT, the Demir judgment would have been just another
on the list confirming the findings of the analysis done here; that is, the
reason why the court referred to a number of complementary international hard and soft international law instruments in Demir was-as in
the other cases discussed in this Article-in order to better serve the object and purpose of the Convention.
After recalling its power to interpret the Convention in the light of
international law,3 2 the Grand Chamber clarified that nothing prohibits it
from also taking into account non-binding documents, '°3 or treaties that
have not been ratified by the respondent state.'3" "The Court observe[d]
... that in searching for common ground among the norms of interna-

tional law it has never distinguished between sources of law according to
whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the respondent
State."'' 5 Although the impression initially given by the court was that it
99.
V v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 176-77.
100.
Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1272 (2009).
101.
Id. at 1297.
102.
Id. at 1293.
103.
Id. at 1294. Contra ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 34, at 366 (arguing that "Article
31(3)(c) covers only established rules of international law, to the exclusion of principles of
uncertain or doubtful legal status, so-called evolving legal standards, policy factors or more
generally related notions").
104.
Demir, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1295.
105.
Id. The more theoretical question raised here concerns whether all the parties to the
treaty being interpreted need also be parties to the treaty relied upon for interpretation purposes. The wording of Article 31(3)(c), which simply requires that the relevant rules of
international law be "applicable in the relations between the parties' is substantially vague
and therefore not of any particular help. See Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation and the
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felt free to rely upon any international treaty without regard to whether
the treaty was binding on the parties, it later explained that it is allowed
to do so only to the extent that the non-binding treaty reflects the parties'
"common values."' 6 Hence, as long as the specialized international instruments reflect a dynamic "emerging consensus" at the international
level, they may perfectly well constitute a relevant consideration for the
court.' °7 Self-evidently, this is another name describing international custom in statu nascendi.'°8 Even if the customary rule is not yet
crystallized, it at least reflects the "common intentions" of the signatory
parties to the ECHR.' °9
Incorporationof ExtraneousLegal Rules, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 281, 307 (2006) (noting that
"neither the provision itself nor its negotiating history provides a definitive answer to these
questions of applicability"); see also Ulf Linderfalk, Who Are 'The Parties'?Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 'Principle of Systemic Integration'
Revisited, 55 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 343 (2008) (defending the idea of the strictest possible
interpretation and reading the term "parties" in Article 31(3)(c) as all parties to the interpreted
treaty). But see id. at 345 n.8 (discussing scholars who disagree with such a narrow interpretation of Article 31(3)(c), including, among others, Petros Mavroidis, Joost Pauwelyn, Campbell
McLachlan, and Duncan French). However, within the literature consensus exists that treaties
such as the ECHR, which introduce obligations erga omnes partes, should be excluded from
the broad interpretation of the term "parties" in Article 31(3)(c). As a general rule, the ILC
suggests that "a better solution is to permit reference to another treaty provided that the parties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty." ILC, Final Report on Fragmentation of
InternationalLaw, supra note 28, 472. Despite the evident risk of divergence in the interpretation of a treaty that this choice entails,
[such a] risk.., would be mitigated by making the distinction between "reciprocal"
or "synallagmatic" treaties (in which case mere "divergence" in interpretation creates no problem) and "integral" or "interdependent" treaties (or treaties concluded
erga omnes partes) where the use of that other treaty in interpretation should not be
allowed to threaten the coherence of the treaty to be interpreted.
Id.
106.
Demir v. Thrkey, App. No. 34503/97, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1272, 1297 (2009).
107.
See id.
108.
Campbell McLachlan is rather critical of the idea that provisions of an international
treaty to which not all the parties are bound should have acquired the status of international
custom in order to be invoked. McLachlan, supra note 34, at 314. Inter alia, McLachlan argues that such an approach would preclude reference to treaties which, although widely
accepted in the international community, are neither universally ratified nor accepted in all
respects as stating customary law. Id.
109.
The ILC seems to offer quite wide discretion to international judges. For treatybased rules to be introduced into judicial reasoning, it is enough that "[the rules] provide evidence of the common understanding of the parties as to the object and purpose of the treaty
under interpretation or as to the meaning of a particular term." 2006 ILC Report, supra note
49, 251(l)(2 1). Or, more precisely:
[Ilt might also be useful to take into account the extent to which that other treaty relied upon can be said to have been "implicitly" accepted or at least tolerated by the
other parties "in the sense that it can reasonably be considered to express the common intentions or understanding of all members as to the meaning of the ... term
concerned." This approach has in fact been adopted in some of the decisions of the
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For a traditional international lawyer, the court's approach in the
Demir case would have to be squarely rejected as it absolutely neglects
states' will and the doctrinal premises of the voluntarist theory. It is,
however, more than obvious that the ECtHR has opted for a pro homine,
objectivist reading of the Convention in fine. Nonetheless, no one can
accuse the court of disingenuity. With its dictum,"0 it openly admits that
what this Article has defined as a pseudo-systemic integration should be
placed under the broader umbrella of the object and purpose of the Convention. Hence, "when [the ECtHR] considers the object and purpose of
the Convention provisions, it also takes into account the international
law background to the legal question before it.'' Indeed, but for a "minor" detail, the Strasbourg Court is exceptionally frank. Yet, what it still
does not avow is that the effective transmutation of Article 31(3)(c) into
a complement to the teleological reading of the Convention depends
upon one important precondition: the relevant norms of international law
must be complementary to the Convention.
ii. Opening the Convention to the Broader System in Order to
Complement Its "Incomplete" Text: Non-Substantive Aspects
Interestingly, ECtHR case law illustrates that this opening of the
Convention to complementary elements of the broader international legal
system is not limited to substantive law. While an activist court like the
ECtHR may, in the name of the humanistic object and purpose of the
Convention and by means of Article 31(3)(c), accommodate within its
regime the substantive evolution taking place within the international
WTO Appellate Body. It gives effect to the sense in which certain multilateral treaty

notions or concepts, though perhaps not found in treaties with identical membership, are adopted nevertheless widely enough so as to give a good sense of a
"common understanding" or a "state of the art" in a particular technical field without necessarily reflecting formal customary law.
ILC, Final Report on Fragmentationof International Law, supra note 28, 472. The ILC is
referring explicitly to the work of Joost Pauwelyn, who was the first to note (in the context of
WTO law) that
the requirement is not that all the parties to the WTO agreement have, one after the
other, formally and explicitly agreed with the non-WTO rule, nor even that this rule
is otherwise legally binding on all WTO members. It could be submitted that the
criterion is rather that the rule can be said to be at least implicitly accepted or tolerated by all WTO members, in the sense that the rule can reasonably be said to

express the common intentions or understanding of all members as to what the particular WTO term means.
JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW

261 (2003).
110.
The Article uses the term dictum in the sense of judicial dictum, that is, the product
of a comprehensive discussion of legal issues.
111.
Demir,48 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 1295.
RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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legal order, it may not be so welcoming to changes having an impact on
the Convention's systemic structures or the court's institutional organization and powers.
In Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey,"2 the court examined
whether the interim measures prescribed under Rule 39 of its Rules of
Court 3 are obligatory upon states. Although its analysis focused on an
evolutive interpretation of the Convention," 4 which aimed at the effective
protection of established rights,"5 the ECtHR also examined the issue in
the light of Article 31 (3)(c) of the VCLT, with reference to general principles of international law and "in particular those concerning the
binding force of interim measures indicated by other international
courts. ' " 6 Only after an impressively extensive reference to the relevant
international practice and case law of other international fora. 7 did the
court conclude that "in the light of the general principles of international
law, the law of treaties and international case-law, the interpretation of
the scope of interim measures cannot be dissociated from the proceedings to which they relate or the decision on the merits they seek to
protect.""' Thus, interim measures should always be seen in the light and
the context of the merits of a case.
Nevertheless, despite recent trends at the international level over the
question of the binding force of the interim measures, it is difficult to see
how a "one size fits all" logic can prevail and equip each and every international judicial forum with such a power in the absence of or even
against state consent," 9 while this consent provides the exclusive source
112.
Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Feb. 6, 2003). The approach was also confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR.

See Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 330 (2005).
113.

Rule 39(1) of the ECtHR's Rules of Court provides that "[tihe Chamber or, where

appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of
its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be
adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it."
Eur. Ct. H.R. Rules of Court 39(1) (2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.intJNR/rdonlyres/
D1EB31A8-4194-436E-987E-65AC8864BE4F/0/RulesOfCourt.pdf (last visited Mar. 26,

2010).
114.
See Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, at 1 94 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003).
115.
Seeid. 105.

116.

Id. 98.

117.
Id. in1 39-54, 100-03.
118.
Id. 1105.
119.
See Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 225, 356 (2005)
(Caflisch, Turmen, & Kovler, J.J., joint partly dissenting) (suggesting that "the matter examined here is one of legislation rather than of judicial action" and that "[a]s neither the
constitutive instrument of this Court nor general international law allows for holding that
interim measures must be complied with by States, the Court cannot decide the contrary and,
thereby, impose a new obligation on States Parties"); cf Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Provisional
Measures Indicated by International Courts: Emergence of a General Principle of Interna-
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of competence for every international judicial instance. Apparently, the
systemic integration function of Article 31(3)(c) is actually comparative' 2 -- by shedding light on the institutional evolution taking place
within different regimes, it leads
to a primafacie, groundless, and ultra
2
1
mimetism.'
institutional
vires
A more tempered approach takes into account that, in ECtHR practice, interim measures are a tool applied only exceptionally and in cases
of urgency in order to prevent imminent or actual heinous human rights
violations threatening the victim's existence or physical integrity. 22 For
example, in Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic the applicants complained
that their lives were at risk and they were in danger of being tortured
after they were extradited to their home state in breach of the interim
measures ordered by the court. That explained, it is easier to understand
the court's point when it linked interim measures to Article 34 of the
Convention,123 under which states parties "uhder[took] not to hinder in
any way the effective exercise of' the right to individual application. The
scope of interim measures could not be dissociated from the proceedings
to which they related and the merits they sought to safeguard, that is to
say, the object and purpose of human rights. In short, here again, the
pseudo-systemic integration function of Article 31(3)(c) appears to be
inseparably (albeit indirectly) linked to the substantive telos of the
ECHR. Accordingly, it can be safely concluded that the Mamatkulov &
Abdurasulovic dictum is neither more nor less activist than that of all the
other decisions in which Article 31(3)(c) has found an application for the
reinforcement of the Convention's substantive provisions.
A second example confirms the argument that has been built so far,
namely that the court may legitimately use Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT
tional Law, 57 REVUE HELL9NIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 53 (2004) (diagnosing, after
proceeding with a thorough analysis of the judicial practice of a number of international fora,
the crystallization of a general principle in international law over the binding effect of provisional measures).
120.
See Franz Matscher, Introduction: Les contraintes de l'interprtationjuridictionnelle: Les m~thodes d'interprdtationde la Convention europ~enne, in L'INTERPRiTATION DE
LA CONVENTION EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 15, 30 (Frfdric Sudre ed., 1998).
According to the author, in order for the ECtHR to find the ordinary meaning of a term it may,
by means of comparison, refer to international instruments other than the ECHR. Evidently,
this is another way of referring to systemic integration. See also De Schutter, supra note 54, at
87-88 (arguing that the comparative analysis is indeed an expression of the evolutive method
of interpretation.) Once again, the two methods-systemic integration and evolutive-

converge.
121.
This term was introduced into the vocabulary of political science by Yves Mdny, La
greffe et le rejet: Les politiques du mimitisme institutionnel, in LES POLITIQUES DU MIM9TISME
INSTITUTIONNEL: LA GREFFE ET LE REJET 7, 7 (Yves Mdny ed., 1993).
122.
Mamatkulov & Askarov, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 328.
123.
Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, 107
(Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 6, 2003).
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to strengthen the Convention's human rights teleology only for substance-related issues. In its very first advisory opinion, 'U the ECtHR was
called to answer whether the Parliamentary Assembly (P.A.) of the
Council of Europe could legally refuse to accept a list of candidates for
judge at the ECtHR submitted by a member state solely on the basis of
gender-related issues, even when the list formally satisfied all conditions
imposed by the ECHR. An alternative way of formulating this question
would be to ask whether the practice of the P.A., which required states to
include at least one candidate belonging to the under-represented sex in
their list of three candidates (a positive measure against the underrepresentation of female judges at the ECtHR), constituted an institutional custom having a normative effect complementary to the text of the
Convention.
The court's point of departure was the text of the Convention and,
more specifically, its provisions concerning the criteria and the procedure for the election of judges. 25' These were read as imposing a nonexhaustive number of conditions, with no explicit limits on the criteria
that could be employed by the P.A. 126 On this view, the P.A. enjoyed wide
discretion in developing practices that would guarantee that the criteria
implicit to the Convention's incomplete text would be satisfied.1 27 However, the court concluded that the criterion relating to the candidates'
gender lacked links to the Convention's text 128 and therefore could not
fall within the P.A.'s implied powers. Nevertheless, the court sought alternate grounds on which to justify the gender criterion. After stressing
the legitimacy of the P.A.'s gender-equality policy, the court silently applied Article 31(3)(c)-this time under a so-called "comparative
analysis" 29-and tried to demonstrate the existence of a "far-reaching
consensus as to the need to promote gender balance within the State and
in the national and international public service, including the judiciary.''3 Once again, the examples given by the court stem from both
relevant instruments of international law and the practice of other interAdvisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates
124.
Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights (Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2008), availableat http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2010).
125.
Id. 45; see also ECHR, supra note 3, arts. 21-22.
Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates
126.
Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, 45
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008).
127.
See id. In 45-47.
128.
Id. 48.
129.
Advisory Opinion on Certain Legal Questions Concerning the Lists of Candidates

Submitted with a View to the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights, at
1 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2008), available at http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2010).
130.

Id. 149.
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national institutions, especially systems of the other judicial fora.' The
results of this comparative approach, although not entirely satisfactory,
convinced the court of the existence at the international33 level of an (evolutive) trend towards the promotion of gender balance.'

This use of the comparative/evolutive method in its reasoning would
likely create in connoisseurs of ECtHR case law an expectation that the
court would conclude with an affirmation of a consensus-stemming trend
in international law in favor of gender balance, and that it would evoke
from this a complementary effect on the text of the Convention. However, to the disappointment of the adherents of international legal
objectivism, the court looked to the volonti of the member states, as reflected in the practice of another organ of the Council of Europe, namely
the Committee of Ministers. The court concluded that by deliberately
choosing to "not to act upon the Assembly's proposals to amend Article
22 of the Convention"' 34 the Committee proved that "the Contracting
Parties, which alone have the power to amend the Convention, ha[d] thus
set the boundaries which the Assembly may not overstep."'35 Therefore,
the court had to refrain from basing its decision on the relevant practice
of the other international institutions. This was the only way for it to restrain its propensity for activism. Evidently, one of the most important
factors explaining this decision was the explicit refusal by states to endorse the P.A.'s institutional practice. Given the particular circumstances
of the case, the court had no other choice than to give priority to the will
of the contracting parties. While its argument was absolutely valid, it is
also important to highlight, however, the fact that the court left aside the
object and purpose reading of the Convention. An institutional question
that, despite its indisputable legitimacy, has only limited (if any) links to
the Convention's substantive provisions leaves no space for a teleological interpretation.
b. Emphasizing Evolution
In addition to assessing the function of systemic integration with regard to complementary norms, the examples presented so far have
sought to demonstrate that the above-mentioned technique is efficient
enough to open the Convention's box to the broader international legal
system, fulfilling a special aim of capturing the evolution and socionormative tendencies within this broader system. In a nutshell, the findings of the analysis indicate that the systemic integration technique can
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. H 30-35, 49.
See id. [34.
Id. 49.
Id. 150.
Id. 51.
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very well accommodate the evolutive one. As far as the opposite is concerned, by definition, the evolutive method of interpretation always
seeks to incorporate the evolution constantly taking place in the broader
socio-normative environment within which a given norm is created or
situated and into which it is integrated. Thus, the two techniques not only converge and complement each other but also share their legal basis in
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.
However, this can only be true if the dynamic reading of the Convention is made with reference to the international legal system. The first
part of the analysis that follows will focus on cases of convergence between the systemic integration and evolutive methods through a dynamic
reading of the ECHR that references international law. In contrast, the
second part will attempt to show that when courts applying the evolutive
technique look to normative sources from outside the international order,
not only is it impossible for this technique to converge with the systemic
integration method, but it may even ultimately introduce within international law changes that are (sometimes) difficult to digest, and that as a
result the evolutive technique can sabotage the anti-fragmentation objective of Article 31(3)(c).
i. ECHR Evolution Following the Tempo
of the International Legal Order
Outside the V v. United Kingdom case discussed supra, another interesting example of convergence between the systemic and the dynamic
techniques is the Sigurj6nnson case,'36 which involved the right of association. The court, after referring to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights and
the practice of the International Labour Office, concluded that "a growing measure of common ground has emerged ...at the international
level,' 3 7 guaranteeing the so-called negative aspect of the freedom of
association, that is, the freedom to not join or to withdraw from an association. It concluded that the effect given to the Convention had to be
adapted to encompass the growing measure. Although the court did not
focus on the object and purpose method of interpretation, it explicitly
rejected the possibility of giving priority to states' will as reflected in the
travaux of the Convention."'
The second example of convergence between the systemic and the
dynamic techniques is equally clear and significant. This significance
stems from the fact that the reason why the court investigated the ongo136.
137.
138.

Sigurj6nsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
Id. at 15.
Id.
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ing evolution in the international system did not have to do with the delimitation of the semantic field of a Convention provision; rather, the
court used Article 31(3)(c) to attribute a special normative quality to Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits torture. In order to conclude in the
Al-Adsani case 39 that the obligations of Article 3 are of a jus cogens nature, the court proceeded by giving an extensive list of relevant
international instruments and case law that confirm this approach.'1° Accordingly, in the court's words:
Other areas of public international law bear witness to a growing
recognition of the overriding importance of the prohibition of
torture.... In addition, there have been a number of judicial
statements to the effect that the prohibition of torture has attained the status of a peremptory norm orjus cogens. 141
Hence, the relevant inputs from international law demonstrated that the
prohibition of torture has evolved and that it had "achieved ' 4' 2 the status
of jus cogens.
In all the instances that have been presented so far, Article 31(3)(c)
facilitates both dynamism in interpretation and pseudo-integration.
Without regard to whether the court highlights integration or evolution,
the function of Article 31(3)(c) is in substance identical. It acts as a supplement to the teleological method of interpretation and facilitates the
effective widening of the scope and effect of the ECHR's substantive
provisions.
ii. Beyond Article 31(3)(c) VCLT: The ECHR at
the Forefront of International Evolution
As argued in extenso supra, the ECHR is a special international law
treaty in the sense that, inter alia, it is indissolubly attached to the idea
of a regional quasi-constitution destined to promote Europe's public order effectively. Consequently, the Convention's dualistic nature allows
ECtHR judges to feel equally competent to investigate socio-normative
evolution both in the international legal order and in what (in Union law
terms) is usually called the common constitutional traditions of the contracting parties. Hence, the systemic integration-oriented, dynamic
interpretation of the ECHR constitutes only one of the two faces of the
evolutive method. Dynamism in the reading of the ECHR is not limited
to the impact of the international legal order. Quite the contrary, it
139.
140.
141.
142.

See A1-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 101.
Id.
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extends well beyond the confines of that order and Article 31(3)(c) of the
VCLT.
That neither the ECHR regime nor the international legal order contains an equivalent to Article 31(3)(c) that explicitly enables the ECtHR
to proceed with an "endoscopic" evolutive interpretation may easily be
remedied either by analogy of law or, more simply, by resorting to the
well-established practice of the court.
The functions of the evolutive/dynamic method can be thought of as
a sui generis periscope, which offers both an endoscopic and a telescopic
field of vision through exposure to both municipal (endoscopic) and international (telescopic) law. Although only the latter is linked directly to
Article 31(3)(c), the systemic integration technique and the objective of
maintaining the unity of international law, the interrelation of the dynamic technique's two dimensions is circular. What the court does in
substance when-as the next few examples will show-it considers evolution occurring in the national legal sphere, is investigate state practice
and the respective opinio juris. In other words, the court inquires into the
emergence of international normative trends, if not of established customary rules. In this sense, the endoscopic version of the dynamic
technique reflects evolution occurring within the broader international
legal system. If this is true, then the way lies open for the court to take
into account the socio-normative progress that arises within the municipal orders of both its contracting parties and third states. The only
conditions for doing so are that the evolution in question present the qualitative and quantitative characteristics that amount to the emergence of a
well-established normative trend and that they do not result in a simple,
vague, and infertile comparison, since doing so would unavoidably lead
to unjustified judicial activism.
The first example concerns one of the most famous judgments of the
court. In the Marckx case, 43 the court assessed problems of equality between children born in and out of wedlock using an evolutive
interpretation based on both national and international law. Hence, "the
Court [could not] but be struck by the fact that the domestic law of the
great majority of the member States of the Council of Europe ha[d]
evolved and [were] continuing to evolve, in company with the relevant
international instruments, towards full juridical recognition of the maxim
'mater semper certa est.'""44 Although the evolution of the issue was, at
that time, far from well-established at the international level and only a
very small number of states had ratified the relevant international instruments, "this state of affairs [could not] be relied on in opposition to
143.
144.

See Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
Id. at 19-20.
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the evolution noted above.' ' 1 45 By validating this dynamic state practice,
the court-as usual--expanded the semantic field of its Convention's
provisions and thereby reinforced its telos. Beyond this, the ECtHR validated a dynamic opinio juris that was by that time emerging at the
regional level and, at the same time, it internationalized the respective
practice. As a result, the court brought the ECHR to the forefront of international evolution, and the broader international system added one
more special instrument evolving towards the direction suggested by the
ECtHR.
In a second example, the court notably chose to base its dictum on
the domestic practice of a handful of non-contracting parties. In its
judgment in the Christine Goodwin case,146 the ECtHR extended legal
status to post-operative transsexuals, clearly departing from previous
case law' 4 that had granted state authorities a margin of appreciation in
determining this status. Despite a lack of social consensus at the European level,'4 8 the court opted for a dynamic interpretation based on "the
clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour.., of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative
transsexuals.' ' 4 9 As proof of this trend, the court gave the examples of
domestic practice in "Singapore, . . . Canada, South Africa, Israel, Australia, New Zealand and all except two of the States of the United States
of America."" Although one may agree with the court's decision to impose common standards, one should nevertheless take note that the use
of the evolutive method of interpretation in Goodwin resembles a fairly
maladroit correction of its previous case law rather than an adaptation to
a genuine dynamic social change. Consequently, the Court's dictum
seems to be deprived of any profound socio-normative foundations and,
therefore, instead of following an international tempo, seems instead to
aspire to introduce a change in tempo.
That said, the more useful theoretical question is whether such a
pushy interpretation of the Convention may contribute to normative
fragmentation. In order to answer this question, one should not overlook
the particularity of the subject matter of human rights and the fact that
this specific discipline of law reflects certain values that are possibly
universally accepted at a macro level. When the question comes, however, to the ad hoc standards of protection or to the priority that should
be given to certain values over others, such consensus-at least at the
145.

Id. at 19.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
See sources cited supra note 58.
Goodwin, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21, 29-30.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 21.
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global level-does not exist. The international legal order is, nevertheless, able to accommodate multiple standards of human rights protection.
Normative fragmentation will only occur if the standards of protection
applied at the regional level become thinner than those prevailing at the
universal level. In other words, there is plenty of room for flexibility.
Yet, if one leaves aside the axiological (and therefore by definition
greatly subjective) field of human rights, the answer at a more general
level to the question of whether an "endoscopic" (that is, divergent from
systemic integration and not supported by Article 31(3)(c)) application
of the evolutive method of interpretation may contribute to the fragmentation of international law depends upon two main factors. First, it
depends on the socio-normative state of affairs of a given subject matter
within the international legal order. Second, it depends on whether and to
what extent an order such as the international legal one is likely to
evolve in the direction towards which the dictum of an international
court points. Hence, even if particular case law is seen to contribute to
prima facie fragmentation of international law-and therefore, to impede Article 31 (3)(c)'s systemic integration objective-there is nothing
to suggest that this characteristic will not be temporary. International
society is far from static: by nature, its legal order undergoes constant
evolution and what might today appear as an activist and illegitimate
judicial interpretation may tomorrow turn into a pioneering exposition
which, instead of challenging the uniformity of international law, will
occupy a central and legitimate place within it.
The general conclusion to be reached from the analysis of this first
category of case law (discussing the use of Article 31(3)(c) by the
ECtHR in the case of complementarity between the ECHR and international law) is twofold. First, the systemic integration method functions in
reality as a complement to the teleological interpretation and, rather than
producing effective anti-fragmentation results, in reality it "uses" international law in order to reinforce the object and purpose of the
Convention. Yet this applies only with regard to the substantive norms of
the Convention. Second, although the systemic integration method and
the evolutive technique do converge under Article 31(3)(c), the (endoscopic version of the) evolutive method of interpretation extends well
beyond the scope of systemic integration, makes reference to sources of
evolution different than international law, and produces results that, under certain conditions, may even challenge the normative consistency of
the international legal order. That being sustained, the Article now moves
in discussing the second scenario of normative systemic integration, that
is, the case of conflicts between the norms of the ECHR and international law.
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2. Conflict Between Norms of International Law and the ECHR
If there is one area in which it is important for systemic integration
technique to produce effective anti-fragmentation results, it is in cases in
which norms conflict. Even when a particular judgment remains silent as
to the applicability of Article 31(3)(c), the latter comes into action ipso
facto. Even so, what is significant is that relevant norms of international
law introduced into judicial reasoning are not those that the court considers relevant, but rather those that are introduced de facto by the
circumstances of a case and are in conflict with the Convention. The examples that follow concern three types of conflicts respectively: (1)
conflicts between the ECHR and general international law; (2) conflicts
between the ECHR and other treaties of international law which produce
a relative normative effect for its parties; and (3) conflicts between human rights treaties.
The best example of a conflict between the ECHR and general international law is the Al-Adsani judgment,'' discussed supra as an example
of convergence between systemic integration and evolutive methods of
interpretation. In a second application of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT,
the ECtHR in Al-Adsani addressed whether the application of the international law rule of state immunity legitimately restricted the applicant's
right of access to justice, that is, a right, according to the Court's case
law, which is inherent to Article 6 of the ECHR. By resorting to Article
31(3)(c), the court recalled that "[t]he Convention, including Article 6,
[could not] be interpreted in a vacuum.... [It] should so far as possible
be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which
152
it forms part, including those relating to the grant of State immunity."
This is the reason why, according to the Court
measures taken ... which reflect generally recognised rules of
public international law on State immunity cannot in principle
be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the
right of access to a court .... [Slome restrictions on access must
likewise be regarded as inherent, an example being those limitations generally accepted by the community of nations as part of
'
the doctrine of State immunity. 53
Based on this Al-Adsani dictum, one could easily reachincorrectly-the conclusion that a right guaranteed by the ECHR can
151.
AI-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79. For similar cases on this
point, see also Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001 -XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157; McElhinney v. Ireland,
200 1-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 37; Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, App. no. 59021/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002)

(decision as to the admissibility).
152.
153.

Id. at 100.
Id.
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lawfully be restricted by a conflicting norm of general international law,
which, ratione materiae, constitutes lex specialis. However, a precondition for lex specialisto supersede in a conflict of norms is that the norms
are of the same nature (that is, of the same hierarchical rank). If this had
been the case in Al-Adsani, then the lex specialis norm, which covers
immunities, would naturally have excluded the application of the conflicting lex generalis, that is, Article 6 of the ECHR, and the debate over
the court's choice would have been simple.'
However, as explained earlier, the Convention's substantive provisions introduce obligations erga omnes partes. The consequences of this
normative quality for Al-Adsani are twofold. First, the logic of lex specialis does not apply to norms not of equivalent standing. Second, given
that the right to access to justice is a typical erga omnes panes obligation, it is-like all non-jus cogens norms-susceptible to legitimate
limitations: the legality and the extent of these limitations are measured
through the well-known proportionality test-a technique used to set
priorities after balancing the material significance of the conflicting
norms in light of circumstances particular to a given case. Yet in the AlAdsani case the court seemed to limit its proportionality test through an
obscure reference to the raison d'9tre of the state immunity rule and its
importance for the international community in general. According to the
Court, the doctrine of state immunity pursues "the legitimate aim of
complying with international law to promote comity and good relations
between States through the respect of another State's sovereignty."'55 As
a result, instead of proceeding with a proper, in-depth test of proportionality, focusing on circumstances specific to the case, the ECtHR
cursorily based its dictum on an implicit presumption that the general
international law norm in question satisfied in abstracto the requirements of proportionality.'56 Thus,
despite its explicit references to the
Convention's special nature,"'7 inreality, the court deliberately chose to
uncritically subsume its own regime to general international law. Moreover, by accepting that the custom over state immunity did not "in
principle ... impos[e] a disproportionate restriction" on the conflicting
right of the Convention and without proceeding any further with its usual

154.
The judgment was far from unanimous. Hierarchy of norms was precisely one of
the points that gave rise to the most severe criticisms. See id. at 111-12 (Rozakis, J. &
Caflisch, J., dissenting). But see GARDINER, supra note 38, at 288 (arguing that the conflicting
norms in AI-Adsani are parallel, that is to say, of equal normative weight).
155.
Al-Adsani, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 99.
156.
Id. at 115 (Loucaides, J., dissenting) (arguing that any form of immunity which is
applied without balancing the competing interests amounts to a disproportionate limitation of
Article 6(1) of the ECHR).

157.

Id. at 100.
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proportionality test,'I8 the court appears to have misused Article 31(3)(c),
the application of which is meant to be limited simply to introducing
relevant norms of international law, without either introducing presumptions concerning their value, nature, or effect, or authorizing the court to
diverge from the judicial steps required by both its well-established practice and law.
Accordingly, even if one were to agree with the conclusions reached
by the Al-Adsani judgment and its prioritization of state immunity over
Article 6 of the ECHR, it is difficult to overlook its obvious defect in
reasoning, which not only leads to an unjustified restriction in the sphere
of application of Article 6 of the ECHR, but also reveals a clear tendency
to use Article 31(3)(c) abusively as an ersatz substitute for the proportionality test. Significantly, the Al-Adsani judgment should not be seen
as a model for the use of Article 31(3)(c) in conflicts of norms. Rather,
the Article's intended function is limited to simply introducing the conflicting norms into judicial reasoning so that a judge may assess their
effect.
It should come as no surprise then that the Court, which instrumentally or not failed to apply the proportionality test in the Al-Adsani
judgment, later put this test fully into action in a case which concerned a
conflict between the Convention's substantive norms and the provisions
of a bilateral treaty negotiated between two states parties to the ECHR.
To move, then, to the second scenario in which Article 31(3)(c) is used
to address normative conflict, it is helpful to look at the Slivenko case.159
In that case, the applicant was deported from Latvia under the terms of a
bilateral treaty between Latvia and the Russian Federation providing for
the withdrawal of the Russian army from Latvian territory. Under the
terms of the treaty, Russian military personnel and all members of their
families were subject to removal from Latvia. The court found that the
consequent interference with the applicant's right to privacy of family
life, protected under Article 8 of the ECHR, was in accordance with the
law (the bilateral international treaty) and pursued a legitimate aim (protection of national security).'60 But this time the court proceeded with an
in-depth test of proportionality 16 and concluded that the Latvian authorities, by perceiving the public interest in abstract terms and by not
examining on a case-by-case basis "whether each person concerned presented a specific danger to national security or public order,'1 62 "failed to
strike a fair balance between the legitimate aim of the protection of
158.
159.

Id.
Slivenko v. Latvia, 2003-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 229.

160.

Id. at 263.

161.

Id. at 263-67.
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Id. at 266.
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national security and the interest of the protection of the applicants'
rights under Article 8. ' 63Consequently, the respondent state was found
to be in breach of its obligations under the Convention.'
On first impression, it seems that the ECtHR in its Slivenko judgment favored its own Convention. However, this is only partially true.
The main aim of the ECtHR was to investigate the extent to which the
two conflicting international treaties-the ECHR and the bilateral
agreement between Latvia and Russia--could harmonically produce
their respective, desired effects.' 6' Given the obvious normative conflict
between them, the court proceeded by examining whether the ECHR
and, more specifically, Article 8, was susceptible to limitation so that
necessary space could be created for the conflicting bilateral treaty to
achieve its intended ends. Since Article 8 of the ECHR does not introduce any obligations of a jus cogens nature, it appears that it can be
elastically limited in "accordance with law," that is to say (in the present
case) in accordance with the will of two member states that had bilaterally contracted to derogate from the Convention to allow withdrawal of
the military personnel from one state to another. However, the erga omnes partes nature of Article 8 of the ECHR should be perceived not only
as allowing derogations; it should also be perceived as giving priority to
the effect of a norm that aims to collectively promote a value common
within European public order. Hence, although at the macro level the
right to family life may suffer limitations in order to promote a legitimate aim of public interest-in this particular case the protection of
national security-at the micro level, limitations can only be accepted if
and to the extent that they comply with the exigencies of proportionality
which, in light of the particular circumstances of each individual case,
balances the general interest with the private interest (rights) of human
beings.
Therefore, a more direct, although provocative, way to describe the
logic of the court in the Slivenko judgment would be to admit that it controls, by way of a proportionality assessment, the compatibility of
conflicting international norms with the substantive provisions of its
Convention, a regional quasi-constitution. Due to the latter's erga omnes
partes quality, derogations are indeed allowed, but only to the extent legitimately justified by the facts of each particular case. As a
consequence, the individual law-making volonti of states, as reflected by
163.
Id. at 267.
164.
Id.
165.
See Ineta Ziemele, Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights and Integrity
of InternationalLaw, in L'INFLUENCE DES SOURCES, supra note 13, at 205. However, Ziemele

remains rather critical of the idea of directly recognizing the normative primacy of the
ECHR's substantive provisions. Id. at 203.
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bilateral or bilateralizable agreements introducing norms of jus dispositivum, can be valid only as long as this volonti does not introduce
obligations that come into disproportionate conflict with the Convention,
the provisions of which apparently enjoy a certain type of normative
primacy, in the sense of elastic priority in their fulfillment.
The third and last hypothesis of conflict of norms to be discussed
here is that of a conflict between the Convention and another international treaty which also introduces obligations of an erga omnes partes
nature. In the Jersild case,' 66 the applicant, a journalist, had been convicted by domestic courts for having conducted and broadcasted an
interview with members of a racist group, as part of a documentary on
the phenomenon of racism. The national authorities, seeking to comply
with the 1965 U.N. International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, which requires states to fight racism
through affirmative action, sentenced the applicant for having aided and
abetted the dissemination of racist remarks. The court first underlined
that a respondent state's obligations under the Convention "must be interpreted, to the extent possible, so as to be reconcilable with its
obligations under the U.N. Convention." 16 However, in applying the proportionality test, the court paid particular attention to the fact that the
applicant had neither made the objectionable statements himself nor intended to spread racist ideas; on the contrary, his objective was to raise
public awareness over a sensitive issue of great public concern. 6 1 It concluded that by disproportionately interfering with the freedom of
courts had breached their obliexpression of the applicant, the domestic
69
ECHR.1
the
of
10
Article
gations under
The first comment to make on the dictum of the court in the Jersild
case is that the observations made previously regarding the Slivenko
judgment remain relevant-the outcome suggests prima facie that the
ECtHR favored its own regime. However, by investigating the legitimate
limitations that the ECHR may (always in the light of the context of the
case) accommodate, the court sought to reconcile the two regimes: it
only concluded that Article 10 of the ECHR had been violated after having applied the proportionality test. Finally, although the normative force
of both the external norms and the provisions of the Convention in abstracto remained intact, the facts of the case required that priority be
given to only one of the two regimes. The fact that, in the end, the proportionality test favored the ECHR is exclusively the result of the
166.
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See Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
Id. at 22-23.
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particular circumstances of the case; should these have been different, so
would the result have been.
What makes the Jersildcase particularly notable is the court's application of the proportionality test in light of the fact that the two
conflicting norms had the same normative nature or formal value (erga
omnes partes). Exactly as in all other cases, the court balanced the conflicting material sources and set priorities in light of the circumstances
particular to the case. Additionally, the circumstances of the Jersild case
reveal that the substantive conflict did not arise between the ECHR and
ICERD directly, but rather between the ECHR and the respondent state's
practice developed to comply with the exigencies of the U.N. Convention. This explains why the lex specialis maxim is inappropriate: even
where there appears primafacie to be a conflict between human rights
norms, true normative conflicts in abstracto-thatis, conflicts per sebetween fundamental human rights are highly unlikely.70
3. Resort to (General) International Law for Questions Outside
the ECHR's Subject Matter
The third scenario to be discussed in assessing the effectiveness of
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT against normative fragmentation corresponds to cases in which the ECtHR must resort to general international
law to address preliminary issues that fall outside the Convention's subject matter and do not find an answer within its "lacunary" text. That a
special international regime must appeal to the broader international legal system to obtain answers to legal questions that are, in light of the
circumstances of the case before it, a conditio sine qua non for it to operate, is proof that special regimes neither are self-contained nor can
subsist effectively if entirely disconnected from their natural environment-that is, the international legal order.'' Nevertheless, several of the
examples below seek to prove that the ECtHR is far from disoriented by
the false allures of self-contained regimes. On the contrary, its more recent case law contains several sound examples in which the court
willingly aligned its dicta with prevailing trends within the international
order (and especially with those emanating from the U.N. system), de-

170.
Concerning the typology of normative conflicts, see PAUWELYN, supra note 109, at
164-66, 175-78. According to the classification proposed by Pauwelyn, the conflict in Jersild
should be defined as a "potential conflict in the applicable law." Id. at 176.
171.
See Koskenniemi, supra note 11, at 17 ("Many of the new treaty-regimes in the
fields of trade, environmental protection or human rights did have special rules for rulecreation, rule-application and change. This is what made them special after all. But when the
rules run out, or regimes fail, then the institutions always refer back to the general law that
appears to constitute the frame within which they exist.").
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spite the fact that such a choice was not always free of cost for the Convention's effet utile.
The most interesting example with which to start is the Loizidou
case, discussed in the introduction of this Article.' Although the court's
decisions and judgments in Loizidou suggest that the anti-fragmentation
function of systemic integration might be costless for the human rights
teleology of the Convention, what is striking in Loizidou is that unity and
fragmentation of international law are shown to co-exist. Thus, if the
court's ultimate aim in silently diverging from ICJ precedent on reservations to international treaties 73 was to favor the ECHR's special object
and purpose, this object and purpose was decidedly not an issue in a
number of other instances in which avoidance of normative fragmentation over preliminary questions of international law either had no
significant impact on the human rights effect of the Convention or was
even a prerequisite for the court in order to exercise its jurisdiction.
Starting then from the first hypothesis, the ECtHR resorted in Loizidou to the broader international system for reasons relatively unrelated
to the object and purpose of the Convention when deciding on the validity of the acts of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC). In
this case, the applicant complained that Turkey had prevented her from
peacefully enjoying her property in northern Cyprus, an area over which
the government of Cyprus has exercised no effective control since a military intervention by Turkey in 1974 and the subsequent establishment of
the TRNC.'7 4 In concluding that the TRNC was not regarded by the international community as a state under international law and,
consequently, that its acts lacked validity, the court expressly applied
Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and referred to relevant U.N. Security
Council Resolutions. 175 By the same token, the court explicitly resorted
to ICJ case law and, inspired by it, concluded that "international law
recognises the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and transactions
...for instance as regards the registration of births, deaths and marriages, 'the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the
inhabitants of the [t]erritory.' ,,176 Interestingly, the ECtHR achieved unity
of international law thanks to its voluntary (and costless) openness to the
interpretative authority of the ICJ case law.

172.
173.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
For a collection of essays on the issue of reservations to human rights treaties, see

RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME: CON-

(Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004).
Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2216, 2221-22.
Id. at 2230-31.
Id. at 2231.
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The Loizidou saga presents an extremely interesting example also
with regard to the second scenario presented supra, namely when avoiding normative fragmentation over preliminary questions of international
law is a prerequisite for the court to exercise its jurisdiction. Whether the
court would exercise jurisdiction depended on how it answered another
question of general international law, namely to whom the illicit conduct
of the TRNC authorities should be attributed. Although its reasoning
lacked the clarity one would expect from a judicial forum of its standing,"' the court merged and answered in the affirmative both the
questions of the attribution of the conduct of the TRNC to the respondent state and the extraterritorial jurisdiction of that state (and thereby
the ECtHR itself).' 78 Interestingly, rather than referring to relevant normative tendencies at the international level, the ECtHR chose to ground
its reasoning on the teleology of the Convention. Hence, "[b]earing in
mind the object and purpose of the Convention," it concluded that "the
responsibility of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action-whether lawful or unlawful-it exercises
effective control of an area outside its national territory."'79 Nevertheless,
although the court seemed to neglect the systemic integration method of
interpretation, in substance its reasoning did nothing more than contribute to the crystallization of the so-called doctrine of the de facto organ,
as this was codified a few years later by ILC in Article 8 of its Norms on
State Responsibility."0
Equally significant is the collateral effect generated by the systemic
integration technique in the frame of another case, Bankovi6,' 8 ' which,
despite its factual differences with the Loizidou case, similarly raised the
question of the extraterritorial effect of the Convention. Although the
177.
See, e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31 (1995) (decision on
the preliminary objections).
178.
Id. at 23-24.
179.
Id. at24.
180.
ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art. 8 ("The conduct of a person

or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international law if the person
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of,
that State in carrying out the conduct."). Interestingly, the interpretation of Article 8 of the ILC
Norms on State Responsibility has opened a Pandora's box of normative fragmentation in the
international case law. In 1999, just a few years after the ECtHR Loizidou decision, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) departed from the ICJ's
Nicaragua "effective control" test. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 64. The Tribunal introduced a less strict level of control in its Tadi6 judgment,
described as "overall control." Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94- 1-A, Judgment, 120 (July

15, 1999). The ICJ then answered with its recent Genocide case law, which criticized the
ICTY's test and insisted on its own Nicaragua dictum. Application of Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.) 2007
I.C.J. 1, 144-45 (Feb. 26).
181.
Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 331.
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court abstained in Loizidou from resorting to systemic integration, its
objective was to establish jurisdiction on the basis of the effective extraterritorial control exercised by Turkey over the TRNC. By contrast, in
Bankovi6 the ECtHR relied explicitly on Article 31(3)(c) to demonstrate
that-with the exception of a handful of cases, including Loizidou,
where extraterritorial jurisdiction applies-jurisdiction remains in principle territorial. However, by placing emphasis on the rule of
territoriality in the exercise of jurisdiction, the court implicitly corroborated the "exception," that is, its rather arbitrary artifice in Loizidou to
silently isolate the criterion of effective control from the norms regulating the attribution of internationally wrongful
acts and apply it as a
8 2
jurisdiction.
of
delimitation
the
for
criterion
More specifically, in Bankovi6 the court based its reasoning mainly
on two axes: the ordinary meaning of the term "jurisdiction"'83 and the
intention of states as reflected both by their practice ' and in the travaux
prparatoires.' Interestingly, although this was not the first time that the
systemic integration method was deprived of autonomous standing, it
was the very first time that it was seen to operate as an auxiliary complement, not to the special object and purpose of the Convention but to
state will. Hence, in order to conclude that "from the standpoint of public international law, the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily
territorial,"' ' 86 the court resorted to a (highly superficial) comparative
analysis of a limited number of international human rights treaties 1 7 and
mainly to the extensive citation of views expressed within legal scholarship.' 8 Interestingly, the court relied on Article 3 1(3)(c) of the VCLT not
to introduce into its reasoning relevant norms of international law but
rather to refer to the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of

182.
See generallyVassilis Tzevelekos, In Search of Alternative Solutions: Can the State
of Origin Be Held Internationally Responsible for Investors' Human Rights Abuses that Are
Not Attributable to It?, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 155 (2010). That article contends that the rules
governing attribution are secondary state obligations that refer to state responsibility. By contrast, the concept of jurisdiction-both territorial and extrateritorial-stens from the
framework of primary state obligations and serves as the basis for delimiting the sphere of
competence. Therefore, the questions of attribution and extraterritoriality are regulated by
different bodies of law and should have been treated by the ECtHR separately. Id.
183.
Id. at 351-54; see also ECHR, supra note 3, art. 1 ("The High Contracting Parties

shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I
of this Convention.").
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Bankovi6, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. at 352.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 351.
Bankovid v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 331, 357-58.
Id. at 351-52.
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the various nations. ' " 9 Apparently, in addition to establishing that it was
not the state's volonti to diverge from the ordinary meaning of the term
"jurisdiction," the court was mainly attempting to justify its own "volontg" to abstain artfully from exercising jurisdiction over an extremely
technical and highly politicized case.90
Moving to another example, the court has been equally constrained
to resort to general international law in order to decide on delicate questions of state responsibility that are not regulated by its own incomplete
special regime. Turning to the emblematic work of the ILC, the court
concluded in Ila cu' 9' that "[a] State may ... be held responsible even
where its agents are acting ultra vires or contrary to instructions."' 92 By
the same token:
A wrongful act may be described as continuing if it extends over
the entire period during which the relevant conduct continues
and remains at variance with the international obligation ....
...

[I]n the case of a series of wrongful acts or omissions, the

breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the
acts and continuing for as long as the acts or omissions are repeated and remain at variance with the international obligation
concerned ....

193

The ECHR, like every other international treaty, introduces legal obligations that, when breached, entail a number of secondary international
responsibility obligations owed by the state to which the wrongful conduct is attributed. Despite its specialized subject matter and the
consequently unavoidable deficient format of its text, the drafters of the
Convention opted to expressly regulate certain issues related to the secondary obligations of states that violate the Convention's substantive
provisions. Article 41 of the ECHR, for instance, refers to the obligation
of states to offer "just" satisfaction to the victim of a human rights violation. Clearly, this obligation corresponds to Articles 31 and 34 of the ILC
Norms on State Responsibility, 9" which require that a certain form of
189.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(l)(d), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1179. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute attributes to legal scholarship the status of
secondary source of international law.
190.
The case concerned the international responsibility of the member states of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for human rights violations allegedly committed
in the course of the humanitarian military intervention in the former Yugoslavia. See Bankovi6,
2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 340-41.
191.
Ila~cu v. Moldova, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
192.
Id. at 264.
193.
Id.
194.

See ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art. 31 ("The responsible

State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally
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reparation be made available to the victim. In this example, Article 41 of
the ECHR constitutes lex specialis.'9 Yet, as it is all too easy to imagine,
not all questions about the extent, nature, and modalities of the secondary obligations of ECHR states parties could have been regulated by its
text. Nevertheless, there are a number of secondary international obligations that-although not explicitly provided in it-are inherent to the
special nature of an instrumentum aimed at protecting human rights. For
example, it would be inconceivable for a human rights treaty to provide
only for the pecuniary satisfaction of the victim without requiring an
immediate
.•196cessation of the wrongful act and guarantee of nonrepetition.
If, finally, one takes into account the fact that the ECHR is silent as
to some of the most fundamental aspects of state responsibility, then it
comes as no surprise that it also does not regulate the extremely thorny
question of the responsibility of its states parties for human rights violations committed by international organizations of which they are
members. 97 Although in the Bankovi6 case the ECtHR skillfully avoided
shedding light on this issue by playing the "extraterritoriality game," in
the Behrami & Saramati case,1gs answering this very same question was
a prerequisite for the establishment of jurisdiction-or rather, as will be
explained below, for avoiding the exercise of jurisdiction. This extremely
complex case is very important for this study for many reasons. First,
like all the other cases included in this section, it demonstrates how it is
essential for the court to turn to general international law in order to deal
with preliminary questions that fall outside the subject matter of the
wrongful act.... Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act of a State."); id. art. 34 ("Full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction,
either singly or in combination, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.").
195.
Thus, the reparation in the ECHR regime takes the form of a "just" satisfaction.
Moreover, according to Article 41 of the ECHR, just satisfaction is to be given "if the internal
law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made."
ECHR, supra note 3, art. 41.
196.
See ILC Norms on State Responsibility, supra note 74, art. 30 ("The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: (a) To cease that act, if it is
continuing; (b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require."). The obligations to cease and not to repeat the illicit act are seen to form
an inherent part of the so-called substantive effect of the final judgments of the ECtHR, that is,
the obligation upon states not only to execute, but, more broadly, to comply with the judgments of the Court. See ECHR, supra note 3, art. 46(1); see, e.g., G6rard Cohen-Jonathan,
Quelques considerations sur l'autoriti des arrts de la Cour europ~enne des Droits de
I'Homme, in MARC-ANDRi EISSEN, LIBER AMICORUM 39,49-50 (1995).
197.
This scenario is to be distinguished from one in which an ECHR state party breaches its obligations under the Convention in order to comply with conflicting international
obligations originating from its membership in another international organization.
198.
See Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos.
71412/01 & 78166/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 31:621

Convention. Second, the Behrami case serves as proof of the fact that,
even when the court was "forced" to apply the systemic integration technique to questions not regulated by its own regime, its selectiveness
remained intact. The court simply "shifted" from selectiveness in the
choice of preferable methods of interpretation to selectiveness in the determination of which relevant norms of international law will be used as
the basis of its dictum. Clearly, reliance upon certain norms implies silent exclusion of others that apparently do not favor the desired judicial
outcome. Third, in the Behrami case, the court comprehensively applied
the systemic integration method of interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) and
in so doing explicitly recalled the potential that this technique offers' in
resolving at least three different issues: (1) the nature and legal status
under international law of the international actors operating in the territory where the alleged violations took place; (2) the genesis, nature, and
extent of the respective competences of these actors; and, (3) the more
complex question of the attribution of the alleged violations.
The applicants in Behrami alleged that their relative's death and injuries had been caused by the failure of the French Kosovo Force
(KFOR) troops to mark and/or defuse the un-detonated cluster bombs
which KFOR had known to be present. KFOR was defined by the court
as an international security force, performing its tasks under the effective
control of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 2°° While acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the U.N. Security Council
delegated the power to establish an international security presence over
the territory of Kosovo to the subjects co-forming KFOR.2 °' KFOR's involvement was described in terms of a "service provider" whose
personnel acted on behalf of the United Nations' Interim Administration
of Kosovo (UNMIK). ° UNMIK was conceived as a U.N. subsidiary
organ to which the Security Council delegated, always under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, the power to administer Kosovo. 203 Its actions
or
2
omissions were directly attributable to the United Nations itself. 04
The case of the second applicant, however, was different. The applicant in Saramati complained about his detention by KFOR and,
therefore, his allegations concerned responsibilities that fell directly under the security mandate of KFOR. °5 As far as the question of the
199.
Id. 122.
200.
Id. ( 114,70.
201.
Id. 129.
202.
Id. 125.
203.
Id. 129.
204.
Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01
& 78166/01, at 129 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility).
205.
Id. 126.
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attribution of the conduct of KFOR's military personnel was concerned,
the court structured its reasoning around the argument of a virtual, multilevel pyramid of control, at the peak of which it placed the Security
Council. The argument was constructed in two stages.
First, the court attributed the alleged misconduct to NATO through
the theory of effective control. Looking to Article 5 of the ILC's Draft
Norms on the Responsibility of International Organizations,2° the court
concluded NATO exercised sufficient effective control over the military
actions through its effective, hierarchical chain of command, even
• 207
though NATO's command over operational matters was not exclusive.
Second, the court relied on the doctrine of delegation of powers. This
time through Article 31(3)(c) the court considered not only the relevant
Security Council resolutions that delegated powers to NATO, but also
relevant studies by legal scholars that confirmed the court's understanding of the nature of the delegation of powers. 208 Consequently, according
to the ECtHR, despite NATO's effective control over the conduct in
question, the Security Council remained at the top of the pyramid as the
institution maintaining "ultimate authority and control" over the former.2 09 "In such circumstances, the Court observe[d] that KFOR was
exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of the [U.N. Security
Council] so that the impugned action was, in principle, 'attributable' to
the [United Nations] ....,,2,0Therefore, the court concluded, the alleged
violations were properly attributed to a subject of international law different than the respondent states, and thus did not come under the
ECtHR's competence rationepersonae."'
It is essential to note at this point of the analysis that in naming the
Security Council as the primary, ultimate, and exclusive subject of law to
which the alleged breaches of the ECHR would be attributed, the court
relied upon a rather academic and highly abstract argument which, although in complete harmony with the doctrinal schemes proposed by a
number of authors, still had little to do with the primary task of a
206.
Id. [ 30-31 (citing ILC, Responsibility of InternationalOrganizations: Titles and
Texts of the Draft Articles 4, 5,6, and 7 Adopted by the Drafting Committee, art. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.648 (May 27, 2004) ("The conduct of an organ of a State ... that is placed at the
disposal of another international organization shall be considered under international law an
act of the latter organization if the organization exercises effective control over that conduct.")).
207.
Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01
& 78166/01, 1 135-41 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility).
208.
See id.
129-31.
209.
Id. 134.
210.
Id. 141.
211.
Id. '1 141-52.
212.
Although the court claimed to use the terms "authorise" and "delegate" interchangeably, id. at 43, itactually silently applied the "delegation of powers" theory, see id.
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judicial organ, namely the pursuit of justice based on the facts specific to
the case before it. To be more explicit, aside from confirming whether
behavior like that in the Behrami case was "in principle, 'attributable' to
the UN,",2 13 the ECtHR's role was to investigate whether the particular
facts of the case before it verified this general rule of attributability to
the United Nations. Yet, even if the outcome of such a fact-based test had
ratified the thesis advanced by the court, 214 it is difficult to imagine what
would have stopped it from applying the systemic integration technique
one last time in order to resort to former Article 28(1) of the ILC Draft
Norms on the Responsibility of International Organizations. 215Article
28(1) would have explicitly authorized the court to pierce the institutional veil of international organizations in order to hold member states
responsible for the alleged wrongful conduct. 6 That explained, it becomes evident that selectiveness in judicial reasoning is thus extended
far beyond a simple choice of the preferable methods of interpretation:
the court enjoyed an equally wide margin of discretion in the selection of
the relevant normative elements to which it referred.

133-36. For a discussion of this theory, see DANESH
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE

SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND

SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY

COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS 163-66 (1999). By adopting this theory, the court
tacitly rejected the theory of "authorization," which emphasizes the dual nature, both institutional and decentralized, of operations like that of KFOR. At the decentralized level, the
wrongful conduct could have been directly attributable to the member states. See LINOSALEXANDRE SICILIANOS, I EXOUSIODOTISI TOU SYMBOULIOU ASFALEIAS TOU OHE GIA CHRISI
VIAS [AUTHORIZATION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO USE FORCE] 168 et seq. (2003);
Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Entre multilatiralisme et unilatiralisme: lautorisationpar le
Conseil de securit9 de recourirailaforce, 339 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 109 et seq. (2008).
213.
Behrami v. France & Saramati v. France, Germany, & Norway, App. Nos. 71412/01
& 78166/01 141 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility).
214.
See, for example, the critical comments by Paolo Palchetti, Azioni diforze istituite
o autorizzate delle Nazioni Unite davanti alla Corte europea dei diritti dell'uomo: I casi Behrami e Seramati, 90 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 681 (2007) (concluding that the
Security Council did not, in practice, exercise overall control over the forces participating in
KFOR).
215.
ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Titles and Texts of the Draft
Articles Adopted by the Drafting Committee on 31 May 2006: Addendum, art. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.687/Add.1 (July 19, 2006) ("A State member of an international organization incurs
international responsibility if it circumvents one of its international obligations by providing
the organization with competence in relation to that obligation, and the organization commits
an act that, if committed by that State, would have constituted a breach of that obligation.").
Interestingly, the examples cited by ILC in its explanatory report are all taken from the case
law of the ECtHR. See ILC, Report of the Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess. Supp.
No. 1, at 283-86, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006).
216.
See Manolis Ioannou, I ypothesi Behrami-Saramati sto EDDA kai to adoxo telos tis
[The Behrami-Saramati Case Before the ECtHR and Its Inglorious End], 2 EEARMOGES DIMOSIOU DIKAIoU 478 (2008).
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In the Behrami case, however, it is obvious that the court did not
wish to leave any room for misinterpretation of its intentions. Thus, although it did not explicitly name Article 28(1), it openly confirmed its
power to examine on the merits allegations of wrongful conduct arising
from its states parties' participation in other international organizations-especially when, within these organizations, the standards of
protection of the Convention's rights were proven to be "manifestly deficient. 22 " Having stated this, the court went on to explain why, in the light
of the circumstances of the Behrami case, piercing the institutional veil
of the organization to which the allegedly wrongful conduct was attributable had not been an option: the fact central to its reluctance to
exercise jurisdiction effectively was the "imperative nature ' 21 8 of the
peace and security objectives entrusted by the international community
to the Security Council. If the court were to exercise jurisdiction, the
effect of the ECHR would have been to interfere with state conduct under Chapter VII U.N. Security Council resolutions.2 9 Moreover, if the
ECtHR were to exercise indirect control over the Security Council via
the common member states of the two respective international organizations, its practice would have come into conflict with Articles 25 and 103
of the U.N. Charter.2 0 Thus while systemic integration arm of the
Behrami case contained one last bullet, the court chose not to use it in
order to favor the human rights telos of its Convention (as it usually
does). Instead it applied systemic integration to justify a foregone conclusion of judicial self-restraint.
To be fair to the Strasbourg Court, it has to be admitted that it did no
more than follow the tempo set by the ICJ. 22' Certainly, giving priority to
systemic orthodoxy does not come free of cost. The green light it appears to have given the Security Council, and the promise for everlasting
immunity, constitute a costly surrender of its own power, detrimental to
its very raison d'Otre (the effective protection of human rights). Although
it would be easy for a skillful court like the ECtHR to point its finger at
the maestro, that is, the ICJ, a judge of Strasbourg is undoubtedly aware
that the systemic symphony to which she submits so eagerly does not
necessarily guarantee a satisfactory acoustic outcome. If the essence of
the unity of international law is the avoidance of fragmentation at any
217.
Behrami v. France; Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01 & 78166/01 T 145 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. May 2, 2007) (decision as to the admissibility).
218.

Id. T 148; see also id.

149.

219.
Id.
220.
Id. 127, 147 (citing Questions of Interpretation and Application of 1971 Montreal
Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14)
(declining, in a famous decision, to review the Security Council acts)).
221.
See Lockerbie, 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14).
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price, then the use of the systemic integration technique in the Behrami
case can be evaluated as successful. But what makes the application of
Article 31(3)(c) in Behrami a success story is not so much the aptitude
of systemic integration to bridge normative elements that are formally
disconnected. On the contrary, this effectiveness seems to result from the
Strasbourg judge's cognizance that her very own judicial forum is part of
a broader, pluralistic, institutional architecture-the de facto rules of
which she is "obligated" to submit to. In substance, then, the Behrami
decision primarily emphasizes the institutional rather than the normative
dimension of integration. Moreover, as the next section will briefly show,
this is not the first time that this technique has been placed at the service
of the institutional idiomorphic economy of the international system.
B. InstitutionalAspects: Abuse of
the Systemic Integration Technique?
In contrast with normative fragmentation, discussed in Part Ill.A
above, the prevailing characteristic of the judicial dimension of institutional fragmentation is incoherence in judgments delivered by
institutionally disconnected international judicial fora ruling over formally distinct cases, which, although founded on different legal bases,
present common, or at least similar facts and, in certain instances, even
common parties. Arguably, the ECtHR's judgment in Bosphorus12 constitutes an exemplary piece of judicial diplomacy in which the court
avoided threatening both the institutional and normative unity of international law, through its sui generis application of the systemic integration
technique. While Bosphorus provides important inspiration to judicial
institutions seeking to avoid bringing the stigma of devastating international systemic harmony upon their heads, as other ECtHR case law
demonstrates, there are also alternative, equally effective, and less pretentious and activist ways for a forum to serve unity.2 23 Nevertheless, the
222.

Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107.

223.

See, for example, the so-called Norwegian Religious Education Cases, in which the

applicants, after being divided into two groups so as to avoid the lis pendens barrier, brought
their common case simultaneously before two different fora (the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the ECtHR). Both institutions declared the cases admissible, examined them on
the merits, and delivered converging dicta. Hum. Rts. Comm'n [HRC], Views: Comm. No.
1155/200, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/l 155/2003 (Nov. 23, 2004); Folger0 v. Norway, 46 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 1147 (2008). The ECtHR, which was the second jurisdiction to decide the case on
the merits, limited its reference to the HRC's decision to a simple, but verbatim, reproduction
of the reasoning reported in its facts section. Id. at 1166-69. However, Strasbourg avoided
making further reference to HCR's dictum and proceeded with its own, autonomous analysis
on the basis of the ECHR. While remaining faithful to their traditional reasoning methodologies, the two fora reached converging conclusions. See Lucas Lixinski, Choice of Forum in
InternationalHuman Rights Adjudication and the Unity/FragmentationDebate: Is Plurality
the Way Forward?,2008 ITALIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 183.
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court's reasoning in Bosphorus is of particular importance to this study
because of the imaginative role it assigned to Article 3 1(3)(c) in combating fragmentation.
The facts of the case are as follows: the applicant corporation
brought a complaint against Ireland alleging that Ireland had violated its
right to property when it impounded its assets-namely two aircrafts
leased from the national airline of former Yugoslavia.2 Interestingly, the
reason the respondent state had interfered with the applicant's right to
property was in an effort to comply with a European Community (E.C.)
law, 225 which in turn was adopted in execution of a Security Council
resolution imposing sanctions on the former Yugoslavia following its
armed conflict.22 6 Failure to honor its Community law obligations would
have caused Ireland to apply conditionality in implementation of its E.C.
and U.N. obligations, in the name of human rights. Faced with this dilemma, the Supreme Court of Ireland referred the Bosphorus case to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) for a preliminary ruling. 7 After concluding that the Irish authorities had appropriately applied the E.C.
regulation at issue (in impounding the former Yugoslavian property), the
ECJ proceeded to balance the right to property against the general interest behind the regulation. In its proportionality analysis, the ECJ pointed
to the importance of proper implementation of the Security Council resolutions, which sought to bring an end to the ongoing conflict in the
former Yugoslavia and to restore peace and security. The court concluded
that, given the importance of these objectives, interference with the ap221
plicant corporation's right to property was not disproportionate.
Having received no relief at domestic level, the applicant next turned
to Strasbourg. The starting point of the ECtHR was to qualify the conduct of the respondent government as "a control of the use of the
[applicant's] property,"229 which the court concluded under the facts of
the case did not amount to an expropriation. Rather, the court determined, the conduct of the Irish authorities fell under the second
paragraph of Article 1 of the Is Protocol of the Convention, which recognizes that states are entitled to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest.2 10 Maintaining its usual line of reasoning, the court next questioned whether there existed a legal basis
allowing interference into the applicant's right. In so doing, it defined the
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Bosphorus, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 115-19.
Id. at 126-30.
Id.
Case C-84/95, Bosphorus v. Minister for Transport, 1996 E.C.R. 1-03953.
Id. at 1-3975 to 1-3977.
Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 152-53.
Id.
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duty of the Irish Government to comply with its obligations flowing
from the E.C. legal order.23'
Traditionally, the final step in the Court's reasoning in similar cases
is the application of the proportionality test. However, while the ECtHR
proceeded explicitly with just such a proportionality test, instead of focusing-as the ECJ had-on the essence of the general interest
underlying both the Security Council resolution and the consequent E.C.
regulation, the ECtHR looked explicitly toward the systemic integration
method of interpretation, recognizing "the growing importance of international co-operation and of the consequent need to secure the proper
functioning of international organisations. 232 The court concluded that
the respondent state's interference with the applicants' property in compliance with its obligations under E.C. law constituted "a legitimate
general-interest
objective within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol
2 33
No. 1."
What the court did not make clear in its judgment is whether, beyond
the rather general and superficial reference it made to the maxim pacta
sunt servanta, it also considered that "international cooperation" and the
"proper functioning of international organisations" are general international law obligations for states. 234 The above analysis of ECtHR case
law has demonstrated that the court understands the reference within Article 31(3)(c) to "relevant rules of international law" to cover a
remarkably ample range of normative elements (such as soft and hard
law instruments, international custom, international case law, and even
legal scholarship). However, the surprising element of Bosphorus is that
the reason the court resorted to systemic integration was not to introduce
any of these normative sources of international law but rather was based
upon an exceptional sort of international necessity-that is, the "need"
to secure the proper functioning of the E.C. legal order.235 The language
of the judgment clearly points towards a strong interrelation between
Article 3 1(3)(c) and the fulfillment of this "need." In its reference to Article 31(3)(c), the ECtHR defined the need for the respondent state to
respect its international obligations vis-a-vis a third international organization (namely the E.C.) as the legitimate counterbalance to the
applicant's right to property-and not the general interest objective that
correspond to the raison d'etre, or rather, the material source of the obligations emanating from that organization. In other words, through
systemic integration, the court silently incorporated the general interest
231.

Id. at 153-56.

232.

Id. at 156 (citations omitted); see also id. at 156-59.

233.
234.
235.

Id. at 157 (citation omitted).
Id. at 156.
Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 156.
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defined by the ECJ (namely, the protection of international peace and
security) into its concerns about institutional overlap and harmonious
compliance with conflicting international legal obligations. Hence, instead of limiting the use of Article 31(3)(c) to its classic normative
function in a typical conflict of norms between the Convention and the
E.C. regulation or the Security Council resolution, the court opted to
widen the spectrum of systemic integration so that the latter also depicted the institutional dimensions of the problem. Doing so inevitably
caused the central question to change: rather than targeting harmonization or setting priorities among the effects of two conflicting
international norms, the court focused on coordinating the practice of
two different judicial fora, which although corresponding to distinct regimes rule on a common question introduced by a single case.
Nonetheless, the ECtHR's decision to abstain from exercising indirect control of compatibility between the ECHR and the relevant E.C.
law entails certain consequences. By dislocating general interest and examining it through the distorting lens of institutional coordination, the
ECtHR deprived itself of the possibility of proceeding with a test of proportionality analogous to that exercised by the ECJ. In addition, the
ECtHR also clearly undermined the soundness of its own test. Due to the
institutional orientation introduced by systemic integration, the proportionality test-in the course of the analysis-was converted into an in
abstracto test of "equivalent protection." Much like in Al-Adsani, the
court seems to have 23abused
Article 31 (3)(c) in order to escape reasoning
6
over proportionality.
Instead, the question raised by the court as the basis for its analysis
was "whether, and if so to what extent, that important general interest of
compliance with [E.C.] obligations [could] justify the impugned interfer23 7
ence by the Irish State with the applicant company's property rights.,
Although states are generally free to transfer sovereign power to international organizations, they remain responsible for any breach of the
Convention, even if the breach occurs when acting in compliance with
conflicting international obligations stemming from these organizations.23
Nonetheless, "[iln the Court's view, State action taken in compliance with
such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is
considered to [be] protect[ing] fundamental rights ... in a manner which
can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides., 23 9 Thus, the court allowed a shift from the proportionality test to an
236.
237.
238.

See Part I11.A (discussing AI-Adsani).
Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 157.
Id.

239.

Id. at 158 (internal citation omitted).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 31:621

equivalent protection test. It concluded that there was no violation of the
Convention after justifying why the protection of human rights in the
E.C. order was, in principle, equivalent to that of its own regime.i
Thus by endorsing the dictum of their ECJ colleagues, the ECtHR
yielded once again to the logic of institutional systemic integration, exactly as it had in Behrami. However, this time the court did not do so
carte blanche, but rather left open an important escape clause:
[The presumption that the EC offers a protection of human
rights equivalent to the level of the ECHR may] be rebutted if, in
the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the
protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such
cases, the interest of international cooperation would be outweighed by the Convention's role as a "constitutional instrument
of European public order" in the field of human rights. 2'
The ECtHR appears to be a courteous specialized forum respectful of
international systemic order. The utilization in Bosphorus of systemic
integration in service of judicial comity42 proves this very clearly. Never240.

Id. at 159-61.
241.
Id. at 158. Indeed, the ECtHR has reviewed already the compatibility of the Union
law with the ECHR. In Matthews v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR found that exclusion of the
people of Gibraltar from the elections for the European Parliament constituted a violation of
the ECHR. See Matthews v. United Kingdom, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 251, 265-66, 272-73.
However, the conflict with the Convention's provisions in Matthews concerned E.C. primary
law, not secondary, as in Bosphorus. The ECtHR had a second opportunity to review indirectly
the E.C. legal order in the Senator Lines case. There, the applicant corporation, on which the
European Commission had imposed a fine for having breached E.C. competition rules,
brought a complaint before the ECtHR alleging violation of its right of access to justice. See
Senator Lines GmbH v. Fifteen Member States of the European Union, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.
331, 333. However, the ECtHR did not examine the case on the merits, since, by the time of
its decision as to the admissibility, the issue had been resolved at the E.C. level and the case
was moot. Id. at 345; see also G6rard Cohen-Jonathan & Jean-Frangois Flauss, Cour europdenne des droits de l'homme et droit international gindral, 94 ANNUAIRE FRANgAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 778, 791-96 (2004). See generally Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, A Tale of
Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the Growing European Human Rights Acquis, 43
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 629, 640-55 (2006) (discussing the informal dialogue developed between the two courts).
242.
On the definition of comity, see, for example, Andrea Gattini, Un Regard Procddural sur la Fragmentation du Droit International, 110 REVUE GIN9RALE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 303, 323-24 (2006). See also Nikolaos Lavranos, Regulating Competing JurisdictionsAmong International Courts and Jurisdictions,68 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L
L. 575, 605 (2008) (qualifying the ECtHR Bosphorus judgment as an act of comity towards
the ECJ). However, it is important to emphasize that, since the comity technique so far has
only occasionally been practiced at the international level, it still lacks any international binding effect. Despite the efforts of legal scholarship to equip it with the force of positive law,
general international law does not contain any norm obliging a forum to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in favor of another court. This silence in positive law leaves ample room for
judicial discretion as to how and when to apply comity. This is why comity can better be understood in the light of the theory of legal pluralism. Contra Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
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theless, the court expects the same from other institutional players, at
least within the European subsystem, where it assumes the role of a
quasi-constitutional forum entrusted with the interpretation of an instrument whose provisions establish a regional public order. 3
A pragmatic evaluation of the Bosphorus judgment requires that a
final, important parameter be taken into consideration. As explained previously, the E.C. legislation in question was adopted in execution of a
Security Council resolution that imposed sanctions under Chapter VII of
the U.N. Charter. By challenging the legality of the E.C. regulation, the
ECHR would inevitably (albeit indirectly) have had to have reviewed the
Security Council's resolution-a role the ECtHR categorically rejected
in Behrami. Thus while ECtHR is clearly a courteous international institution, it remains blurred within Bosphorus as to which institution it
really addresses this courtesy. Quite often, appearances are said to be
deceptive-and indeed the Bosphorus judgment would seem to confirm
this rule.

CONCLUDING REMARKS: ATTEMPTING A SYNTHESIS

Can Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT serve effectively as an antifragmentation tool in the hands of an international judge? The case law
of an international judicial forum entrusted with the interpretation of a
"special" instrument designed for the promotion of regional integration
by means of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law suggests that
the mission assigned to the Article 31(3)(c) can take at least four different forms.
When, first, the relevant rules of international law are complementary to the ECHR, ECtHR case law shows that these rules can be
effectively absorbed by the Convention, with an expanding effect on its
text. In this case, systemic integration works in substance as a complement to the special object and purpose of the Convention. In this
capacity, Article 31(3)(c) allows ECtHR judges to open their regime to
the broader international system and selectively collect normative materials (both mature and "softer" ones, based on the relevant practice of
states, international organizations, and international judicial fora),
Multilevel Judicial Governance of International Trade Requires a Common Conception of
Rule of Law and Justice, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 529 (2007) (contending that judicial institutions
are committed to pursue justice in the frame of a common objective understanding of the concept of the rule of law).
243.
As Judge Ress argues in his concurring opinion in Bosphorus, Article 31(3)(c)
"cannot be interpreted to give treaties concluded between the Contracting Parties precedence
over the Convention." Bosphorus v. Ireland, 2005-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 107, 170 (Ress, J., concurring).
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enriching the incomplete text of the Convention and, thereby, broadening
the semantic field of its provisions in a way that provides greater human
rights protection but that can also easily extend further than or against
state will. In this first scenario, the effect of Article 31(3)(c) is to reinforce the Convention's special telos. Whether this reinforcement leads
towards the uniformity of international law or works as a potential
source of fragmentation depends on the degree of maturity of the relevant sources of international law incorporated into the Convention.
However, even if the ECHR regime is proven to move faster than the
prevailing tempo within the broader system and therefore to diverge-at
least temporarily-from it, there is still nothing to prohibit a regional
sub-system from introducing higher standards of protection for human
rights. When norms are complementary, true normative fragmentation is
highly unlikely to occur. This is because the international system can
easily accommodate multiple schemas of human rights protection, and
fragmentation will occur only when standards of protection adopted by
one regime are unduly lower than or divergent from those prevailing at
the universal level. This definitely is not occurring at the ECtHR.
If, on the contrary, there is a conflict between the relevant norms of
international law and the ECHR, the systemic integration method of interpretation comes into play ipso facto. Although this scenario is by far
the most important in which Article 31(3)(c) can act as a counterweight
to fragmentation, analysis of the case law demonstrates that systemic
integration cannot (and should not) provide more than a simple "point of
contact" between conflicting norms. Beyond this basic function, there is
little, if any, room at all for systemic integration to effectively promote
the unity of international law.2" Rather, it resigns this role to classic and
well-known techniques used to resolve conflict of norms problems. Next
to these, special tribute must be paid to the role of the proportionality
244.

As Nele Matz-Ldick suggests:

[Article 31(3)(c)] is a viable principle for several tasks: filling gaps left by a treaty,
clarifying unclear terms and generally safeguarding that terms used in a similar
context are understood in a similar way. However, the viability of this specific kind
of interpretation as a conflict-solution tool is less obvious. Systemic integration
may fail if it is the system that is in many ways incoherent.
Matz-Liick, supra note 29, at 50; see also Benn McGrady, Fragmentation of International
Law or "Systemic Integration" of Treaty Regimes: EC Biotech Productsand the ProperInterpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 42 J. WORLD
TRADE 589, 607 (2008) ("Article 31(3)(c) only applies ... to situations where two treaty obligations are capable of being read together. That is, Article 31(3)(c) applies where those

obligations are not in 'conflict' with one another. As such, an extraneous treaty cannot be
applied by a decision maker and cannot modify the applicability of the treaty under interpretation. Rather, the role of the extraneous treaty is to cast light upon the question of how the
obligations set out in the treaty under interpretation are to be applied.") (citation omitted).
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assessment: given the erga omnes panes nature of the ECHR's substantive provisions, proportionality is an unparalleled tool to help ECtHR
judges balance the human rights telos of the Convention against conflicting norms of international law and the general interest objectives these
norms pursue. The aim of the proportionality tool is simply to set ad hoc
priorities among normative effects, without affecting the normative force
of the conflicting norms.
The third use of systemic integration arises when the ECtHR resorts
to general international law to fill a "lacuna" in the ECHR regime, without which the ECHR could not achieve its effet utile. Given the
specificity of the Convention's subject matter, the case law demonstrates
that this scenario occurs frequently. Judges often have no choice but to
resort to general international law for answers that will 'unlock' the effect of the Convention. In most instances, the court uses systemic
integration to legitimately give effect to the Convention's telos. Nonetheless, it would come as no surprise if, due to the special nature of its
instrumentum, the ECtHR silently abstained from resorting to Article
31(3)(c). The examples analyzed in Part III.A.3, supra, indicate that,
although systemic integration arguably functions effectively, its results
as to the object and purpose of the ECHR are by no means predictable.
The outcome ultimately depends on the will of the court and on the
choices it makes in light of the circumstances of a particular case and of
the broader political context in which the case arises. Although Article
31(3)(c) may be extremely useful to render the ECHR effective, it has
equally been used by the court to limit its own jurisdiction and to avoid
deciding cases. However, whether or not it is employed in favor of or
against the effectiveness of the ECHR, the systemic integration technique neither justifies the application of double standards in ECtHR case
law nor remedies the absence of legitimacy in its dicta.
Finally, although Article 31(3)(c) has often been promoted as a
means to avoid normative fragmentation, Part II.B discussed a fourth
and final category of cases in which the ECtHR has applied Article
31(3)(c) as a mechanism for preventing institutional fragmentation. Although strong conclusions cannot be drawn from a single case, reliance
on Article 31 (3)(c) enabled the court to reach its comity outcome in Bosphorus-an outcome that cannot not be explained in terms of positive
international law nor be accommodated within it. The self-restraint the
court voluntarily demonstrated in the name of systemic integration can
find better explanation in legal pluralism, 45 and the institutional courtesy
See generally supra note 242 and accompanying text. For an overview of the litera245.
ture on legal pluralism, see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism,80 S. CAL. L. REv.
1155, 1169-79 (2007).
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that this pluralism entails. What, however, is evident is that the effectiveness of systemic integration -in cases of institutional fragmentation may
very well be limited by a number of imponderable external factors, such
as the political dimensions of a case, the balance of power between the
various fora, and the historical moment in which the cases arise.
As a result, the overall effectiveness of systemic integration as an
anti-fragmentation method cannot be measured in absolute terms. Indeed, "the role of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT may have been inflated. 46 The
safest conclusion to reach is that the ECtHR may apply Article 31(3)(c)
in a wide variety of ways, enjoying selectiveness which extends well
beyond its discretion on whether or not to resort to it. The court is equally free to decide which ends its application will serve and which norms
of international law it will introduce as "relevant" to its reasoning. Clearly, the Strasbourg Court is much more responsive to the spirit of Article
31(3)(c) than to its letter (and the limitations this approach entails). As a
result, whether rightly or wrongly, the systemic integration technique can
only be as effective as the ECtHR wants it to be. In the end, then, the
court is the only body competent to decide how "special" or, conversely,
how integrated into the systemic orthodoxy it wants to be.
Describing in these terms the ECtHR's use of Article 31(3)(c) gives
rise to the question of whether the article might create a loophole facilitating judicial activism. Critics would emphasize that the ECtHR often
resorts to Article 31(3)(c) in order to render possible a rather objectivist
and less voluntarist reading of the Convention, that both expands the

246.

Van Damme, supra note 35, at 38. Van Damme suggests that "[i]rrespective of

whether 'systemic integration' is called a concept, a principle, an approach, a technique, or an
objective, the concrete meaning and status of 'systemic integration' in international law will
eventually be developed and argued by practitioners and judges." Id. at 27.
247.
As Judge A.A. Cangado Trindade admits:
Generally recognised principles or rules of international law-which the formulation of the local remedies rule in human rights treaties refers to,-besides following
an evolution of their own in the distinct contexts in which they apply, necessarily
suffer, when inserted in human rights treaties, a certain degree of adjustment or adaptation, dictated by the special character of the object and purpose of those treaties
and by the widely recognised specificity of the international law of human rights.
Caeser v. Trinidad & Tobago, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, at 299 (Mar. 11,
2005) (Cangado Trindade, J., separate opinion) (citations omitted). This is why, as has been
argued by two eminent former judges of the European and the Inter-American Courts of Hu-

man Rights, the ECHR and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights systems are on
one hand, based on international law, instituted by international conventions, and therefore
governed by the law of treaties, and on the other hand, their application may conflict with

general international law. See Lucius Caflisch & Ant6nio A. Cangado Trindade, Les conventions amgricaine et europienne des droits de l'homme et le droit internationalggniral, 108
REVUE GgNERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1, 60 (2004).
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sphere of application of its substantive provisions and guarantees the
effectiveness of its special telos.
The counterargument, however, is strong and moves in two directions. First, not all of the (implicit or explicit) applications of Article
31(3)(c) have enabled such a reading or outcome at all. Second, Article
31(3)(c) may allow activism no less or no more than any other method of
interpretation meant to promote the object and purpose of a special international treaty. This second counterargument also explains why, in the
case of complementarity between the ECHR and the relevant norms of
international law, the systemic integration and dynamic techniques converge or even coincide. Both methods act, in substance, as a supplement
to teleological interpretation, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the
court's choice to give priority to the object and purpose of the Convention.
This is not the only case, however, where Article 31(3)(c) serves as a
servitore di due padroni, accommodating both methods of interpretation
under its umbrella. If evolution is to be inherent to a non-static legal order such as the international one, then the opening-by means of
systemic integration-of the ECHR's box towards that order should be
equally inherent. A systemic integration which is not done in the spirit of
evolution would be, by definition, anachronistic and therefore defective,
deficient, and imperfect.
Systemic integration corresponds, however, only to one of the two
dimensions of evolutive interpretation. The evolutive/dynamic method
extends beyond that of systemic integration, such as when ECtHR judges
derive normative sources of inspiration from outside the international
system. Although it may appear that the regime of the ECHR is evolving
outside, or even in contradiction to the international legal order, one
should recognize that, since the latter is the natural environment within
which the ECHR operates, any deflection in its interpretation from that
order triggers evolution within the international order and, evolution of
the international order itself. 248 That is to say, when the systemic integration and the dynamic methods of interpretation do not converge, they
interact circularly. This non-systemic expression of evolution falls outside Article 31(3)(c) and generates results even having the potential to
challenge the normative unity of international law. Yet nothing excludes
that this phenomenon will not be temporary-for a dynamic system such
as the international legal order disposes of the means to both reject or
integrate any kind of evolution. Finally, venturing a more general reflection on the overall function of Article 31(3)(c), it could be argued that
248.
See Luzius Wildhaber, The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law, 56 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 217, 230-31 (2007).
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the article provides an aperture into and out of the ECHR regime,
through which the judges of Strasbourg can observe, consider, and possibly even integrate or modify broader international law. Ultimately this
view cannot be but finite, and depends on a number of factors: the degree of maturity or compactness of the international system, the
momentum within it, the distance separating the judge from her broader
socio-normative environment, and, most of all, the intentions of the judicial forum. Yet even if judicial altruism could be taken for granted,
undeniably the core of the fragmentation phenomenon-that is, the need
in certain cases to set priorities between trade and environment, human
rights and trade, etc. 24 9-- reflects, first and foremost, a certain discrepancy, divergence, or even fragmentation in the hierarchy of values that
are the material source for those fragmented norms within the international arena. 2' 0 By definition, then, the answer to a post-modern question
must be equally post-modern.

249.
One must refer here to the very systematic work of Joost Pauwelyn, who discusses
the relationship between international law and World Trade Organization law. Among several
other works by this author, see Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public InternationalLaw in the
WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001). For a collection of essays on,

more specifically, trade and human rights, see, for example,
TIONAL

TRADE

(Thomas

Cottier et al.

eds.,

2005);

HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNAPUBLICATIONS

DE

L'INSTITUT

INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, COMMERCE MONDIAL ET PROTECTION DES DROITS
DE L'HOMME: LES DROITS DE L'HOMME A L'tPREUVE DE LA GLOBALISATION DES ICHANGES

ECONOMIQUES

(2001).

250.
See Koskenniemi, supra note I1, at 16 (arguing that "[c]onstitutionalism, as we
know it from the national context, relies on some basic understanding of the common good
.... In the international world, there is no semblance of this beyond the languages of diplomacy and positive law, whose fragmentation and indeterminacy provided the starting-point for
the search for an (implicit) constitution.") (citation omitted).

